管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (8): 219-232.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    

基于BOPS的制造商合同选择与零售商渠道整合演化博弈分析

马琳, 邱若臻   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院, 沈阳 110169
  • 收稿日期:2023-04-18 发布日期:2025-09-09
  • 作者简介:马琳，东北大学工商管理学院博士研究生；邱若臻(通讯作者)，东北大学工商管理学院教授，博士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72272030)；教育部人文社会科学研究项目(22YJA630064)；中央高校基本科研业务费项目(N2306007)。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Manufacturer Contract Choices and the Retailer Channel Integration Based on BOPS

Ma Lin, Qiu Ruozhen   

  1. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169
  • Received:2023-04-18 Published:2025-09-09

PDF (PC)

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摘要： 考虑一个制造商和一个零售商组成的二级供应链系统，其中制造商可以采用传统的批发（WS）合同或代发货（DS）合同将产品售卖给零售商，或履行零售商的线上订单，零售商可以采用线上渠道或“线上购买、线下取货”（BOPS）渠道将产品售卖给消费者。在此背景下，针对制造商和零售商分别面临的合同选择和渠道整合问题，基于以制造商为主方，零售商为从方的Stackelberg博弈模型，建立了以有限理性制造商和零售商为博弈主体的二维动态博弈模型，使得制造商和零售商各自利润最大化。在此基础上，运用演化博弈理论分析博弈双方策略选择的动态演化过程，并给出了演化稳定策略。最后，通过仿真实验验证所建模型的有效性。研究结果表明：制造商和零售商的利润随消费者等待成本的增加而减少；制造商的利润随佣金率的增加而减少，零售商的利润随着BOPS便利系数的增加而减少。特别地，当消费者等待成本和BOPS便利系数较高时，制造商倾向于采用WS合同；反之，更倾向于选择DS合同。当消费者等待成本较低或佣金率较高时，零售商倾向于采用线上零售渠道；而当消费者等待成本过高或佣金率较低时，零售商更倾向于采用全渠道（线上+BOPS）策略。

关键词: 全渠道零售, BOPS渠道, 合同选择, Stackelberg博弈, 演化博弈

Abstract: This paper considers a two-level supply chain system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, in which the manufacturer can sell products to the retailer by using the traditional wholesale (WS) contract or fulfill online orders of the retailer by using the drop-shipping (DS) contract, and the retailer can sell products to customers through the online channel or the “buy online and pick up in store” (BOPS) channel. In this context, the relationship between contract choices of the manufacturer and channel integration of the retailer is studied. Firstly, a two-dimensional dynamic game system with the bounded rational manufacturer and retailer as game subjects is established by using the Stackelberg game model with manufacturers as the main player and retailers as the follower to maximize their respective profits. Secondly, the evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the dynamic evolutionary process of strategy selection by two parties in the game, and obtain the evolutionary stable strategies under different scenarios. Finally, the numerical experiment is implemented to verify the validity of the proposed model. The results show that the profits of the manufacturer and retailer decrease with the increase of customers’ waiting cost; the profit of the manufacturer decreases with the increase of the profit sharing rate, and the profit of the retailer decreases with the increase of BOPS convenience coefficient. Further, when the customers’ waiting cost and BOPS convenience coefficient are both too high, the manufacturer tends to adopt the WS contract strategy; On the contrary, the manufacturer tends to adopt the DS contract. When the customers’ waiting cost is low or the profit sharing rate is high, the retailer prefers to adopt the online retail strategy; when the customers’ waiting cost is too high or the profit sharing rate is low, the retailer prefers to adopt the omnichannel retail strategy (Online + BOPS).

Key words: omnichannel retailing, BOPS channel, contract choice, Stackelberg game, evolutionary game