管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (8): 208-218.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    

基于第三方制造平台的质量异质供应商质量信息披露策略与激励机制

张旭梅1,2, 张晟铭1,2, 周卓霖1,2, 查晓宇1,2, 但斌1,2   

  1. 1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400044;
    2. 重庆大学物流与供应链管理创新团队, 重庆 400044
  • 收稿日期:2023-04-21 发布日期:2025-09-09
  • 作者简介:中文作者简介张旭梅(通讯作者)，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授，博士生导师，博士；张晟铭，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院博士研究生；周卓霖，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院硕士研究生；查晓宇，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院博士研究生；但斌，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授，博士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72072016)；重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究基地项目（25SKJD015）。

Quality Information Disclosure Strategies and Incentive Mechanism for Heterogeneous Suppliers Based on Third-party Manufacturing Platforms

Zhang Xumei1,2, Zhang Shengming1,2, Zhou Zhuolin1,2, Zha Xiaoyu1,2, Dan Bin1,2   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044;
    2. Logistics and Supply Chain Management Innovation Team, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044
  • Received:2023-04-21 Published:2025-09-09

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摘要： 本文针对两类质量异质供应商和第三方制造平台组成的供应链，考虑供应商拥有私有质量信息，构建以平台为主导的4种质量信息披露策略下的动态博弈模型，分析了质量异质供应商的最优质量信息披露策略，探讨了供应商零部件质量和平台上高质量供应商的概率等因素对供应商质量信息披露决策的影响。在此基础上，设计了平台激励供应商进行质量信息披露的激励契约，并探讨了激励前后供应链成员均衡决策的变化。研究结果表明：高质量供应商和普通供应商均有披露或不披露质量信息的动机；在一定条件下，两类供应商均披露质量信息能获得更高的利润，但供应链并不一定能获取更高收益；当两类供应商均不披露质量信息时，平台可以采用转移支付契约激励高质量供应商披露质量信息。

关键词: 共享制造, 第三方平台, 质量信息披露, 供应链, 激励机制

Abstract: For a supply chain composed of two heterogeneous suppliers and a third-party manufacturing platform, this paper analyzes the optimal quality information disclosure strategy of heterogeneous suppliers by constructing a dynamic game model considering that the suppliers have private quality information. Due to exploring the factors that affect the suppliers’ quality information disclosure decision, this paper discusses the influence of the supplier’s product quality and the probability of high-quality suppliers on the platform. On this basis, this paper designs an incentive contract to motivate suppliers to make quality disclosure. Then this paper discusses the changes in supply chain members’ balanced decisions before and after incentives. The results indicates that both high-quality suppliers and ordinary suppliers have the motivation to disclose or not to disclose quality information. Under certain conditions, both types of suppliers can obtain higher profits by disclosing quality information, but the supply chain does not necessarily obtain higher profits. While both types of suppliers do not disclose quality information, the platform can use transfer payment contracts to encourage high-quality suppliers to disclose quality information.

Key words: shared manufacturing, third-party platform, quality information disclosure, supply chain, incentive mechanism