政府放权激发了国有企业购买董事高管责任保险吗？

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 以我国沪、深两市2007—2022年国有控股公司为研究对象，研究了政府放权如何影响国有企业购买董事高管责任保险，以及上述影响在不同情境下的差异。结果表明：政府放权减少了政府保护，提高了国有企业市场化经营和风险承担水平，进而激发国有企业购买董事高管责任保险。政府放权对国有企业购买董事高管责任保险的激励效应受到行业竞争程度和社会信任氛围的制约，行业竞争程度增强了政府放权对国有企业购买董事高管责任保险的促进效应，而社会信任减弱了政府放权对国有企业购买董事高管责任保险的促进效应。此外，本研究还发现，政府放权促进了国有企业风险承担和创新，进而促进国有企业购买董事高管责任保险，企业风险承担和创新是政府放权影响国有企业购买董事高管责任保险决策的重要中介机制。本文将政府放权引入至企业购买董事高管责任保险决策的研究中，丰富和拓展了企业购买董事高管责任保险决策影响因素和政府放权经济后果的研究，为深刻认识我国企业购买董事高管责任保险积极性不高的现实状况提供了一个全新解释。

关键词: 政府放权, 董事高管责任保险, 行业竞争程度, 社会信任

Abstract: Based on a sample of Chinese state-owned companies from 2007 to 2022, this paper studies the effect of government decentralization on directors’ and officers’ liability insurance purchase decision in state-owned enterprises and the moderating effect of industry competition and social trust. The results show: government decentralization reduces government protection, promotes market-oriented operation and risk-taking in state-owned enterprises, and in turn motivates state-owned enterprises to purchase D&O insurance. The incentive effect is restricted by industry competition and social trust atmosphere. Industry competition enhances the promotion effect, while social trust negatively moderates the relationship. In addition, this study also finds that government decentralization promotes risk taking and innovation, thereby promoting the purchase decision of D&O insurance. This paper introduces government decentralization into the study of the purchase decision of D&O insurance, enriches and expands the research on the affecting factors of the purchase decision of D&O insurance and the economic consequences of government decentralization, and provides a new explanation for the reality of the low use of D&O insurance in China’s transitional economy.

Key words: government decentralization, D&O insurance, industry competition, social trust

苏坤, 范亦璇. 政府放权激发了国有企业购买董事高管责任保险吗？[J]. 管理评论, 2025, 37(6): 3-14.

Su Kun, Fan Yixuan. Does Government Decentralization Inspire the Purchase of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance in State-owned Enterprises?[J]. Management Review, 2025, 37(6): 3-14.

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