管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (6): 212-225.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    

授权再制造下闭环供应链的联盟策略研究

梁佳平1, 李璟2,3, 于兆青4   

  1. 1. 中国石油大学(华东)经济管理学院, 青岛 266580;
    2. 上海政法学院经济管理学院, 上海 201701;
    3. 复旦大学管理学院, 上海 200433;
    4. 山东建筑大学管理工程学院, 济南 250101
  • 收稿日期:2023-04-12 发布日期:2025-07-10
  • 作者简介:梁佳平，中国石油大学（华东）经济管理学院博士研究生；李璟（通讯作者），上海政法学院经济管理学院讲师，复旦大学管理学院博士后，硕士生导师，博士；于兆青，山东建筑大学管理工程学院讲师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金青年项目（22CGL020）。

Alliance Strategy Optimization of Closed-loop Supply Chains with Authorized Remanufacturing

Liang Jiaping1, Li Jing2,3, Yu Zhaoqing4   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao 266580;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai 201701;
    3. School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433;
    4. School of Management Engineering, Shandong Jianzhu University, Jinan 250101
  • Received:2023-04-12 Published:2025-07-10

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摘要： 为了提升核心制造优势并满足“双碳”目标，基于授权再制造模式，原始设备制造商(OEM)与下游零售商、第三方再制造商(TPR)联盟合作，构成了逆向回收渠道合作、正向销售渠道竞争的闭环供应链联盟结构。为了更好地发挥联盟的正向效应，本文首先构建四种联盟结构模型，即无联盟、OEM+零售商、OEM+TPR以及TPR+零售商战略联盟，在差异化产品竞争的市场情形下优化各主体决策。然后，以无联盟结构为基准，找出了渠道成员彼此联盟的动机条件。进一步，通过Nash协商模型讨论了各联盟结构的稳定性问题。最后，借助理论和数值模拟分析了不同联盟结构对供应链均衡决策、消费者剩余和环境效益的影响。研究发现：OEM参与联盟加剧了不同产品的竞争，刺激市场需求的增长；零售商参与联盟提高新产品的市场占有率，然而不利于废旧品的回收再制造；TPR参与联盟增大不同产品零售价之间的差额，使再制造品更具竞争力；渠道成员均具有充分的联盟动机，但仅OEM+零售商联盟结构具有稳定性。此外，只有OEM参与联盟才会给消费者带来更大效益；而TPR参与联盟则是对环境最有益处的模式。

关键词: 授权再制造, 闭环供应链, 联盟策略, 决策优化

Abstract: To enhance the core manufacturing advantages and achieve the “dual carbon” goal, original equipment manufacturers (OEM) make the alliances with downstream retailers and third-party remanufacturers (TPR) based on the authorized remanufacturing model, forming a closed-loop supply chain alliance structure of reverse recycling channel cooperation and forward sales channel competition. For better leveraging the positive effects of alliances, we construct four alliance structures, including no alliance, OEM-retailer alliance, OEM-TPR alliance and retailer-TPR alliance. Then, we optimize the decisions of enterprises under the market situation of differentiated product competition. Furthermore, we use the optimal profit of no alliance structure as the benchmark to test whether channel members have the motivation to form alliances with other members. Besides, the Nash negotiation model is used to solve the internal profit distribution problem of alliances and investigate the stability of each alliance structure. Meanwhile, the differences of optimal decisions, consumer surplus and environmental impact among different alliance structures are compared through theoretical and numerical analysis. The results show that the participation of the OEM in an alliance can intensify the competitive pressure of new and remanufactured products and stimulate the growth of total market sales; the retailer’s participation in an alliance increases the market share of new products, but it is not conducive to the recycling and remanufacturing of used products; when the TPR participates in an alliance, the retail price differences between the new and remanufactured products increases, which is beneficial to enhancing the market competitiveness of remanufactured products. Any two parties in the closed-loop supply chain are highly motivated to ally with each other, but only the alliance structure formed by the OEM and the retailer can remain stable. In addition, the OEM always has the advantage of profit distribution while the TPR always has the disadvantage of profit distribution in different alliance structures. From the consumer perspective, an alliance with the OEM can bring benefits to consumers; from the environmental point of view, an alliance with the TPR may be the most beneficial to the environment.

Key words: authorized remanufacturing, closed-loop supply chain, alliance strategy, decision optimization