管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (1): 114-126.

• 创新与创业管理 • 上一篇    

“自私的”管理者抑制了企业低碳技术创新吗？——基于显性与隐性视角的二元研究

李楠博1, 孙弘远2, 李书1, 孙咏梅3   

  1. 1. 长春理工大学经济管理学院, 长春 130021;
    2. 北京大学深圳研究生院环境与能源学院, 深圳 518071;
    3. 中国人民大学经济学院, 北京 100872
  • 收稿日期:2023-02-22 发布日期:2025-01-18
  • 作者简介:李楠博，长春理工大学经济管理学院副教授，博士生导师，博士；孙弘远，北京大学深圳研究生院环境与能源学院博士后；李书，长春理工大学经济管理学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士；孙咏梅，中国人民大学经济学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金青年项目（21CGL033）。

Do “Selfish” Managers Inhibit Corporate Low-carbon Technology Innovation? A Binary Study Based on Explicit and Implicit Self-interested Behavior

Li Nanbo1, Sun Hongyuan2, Li Shu1, Sun Yongmei3   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Changchun University of Science and Technology, Changchun 130021;
    2. College of Environment and Energy, Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School, Shenzhen 518071;
    3. School of Economics, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872
  • Received:2023-02-22 Published:2025-01-18

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摘要： 企业是低碳技术创新的主体，平衡企业管理者个人利益与低碳技术创新的关系，能有效提升企业低碳技术创新水平，助力“双碳”目标实现。本文以2012—2022年沪深A股上市的高碳排企业为样本，考察了管理者显性与隐性二元自利行为对企业低碳技术创新的影响，探讨了不同所有权性质和企业生命周期的差异性影响效果，并刻画了管理者自利行为影响低碳技术创新的显性与隐性二元机制。研究结果显示：管理者显性与隐性自利行为均会抑制企业低碳技术创新，且这一抑制效果存在滞后性；非国有企业管理者显性与隐性自利行为均抑制低碳技术创新，国有企业低碳技术创新则仅受管理者隐性自利行为影响；隐性自利行为对处于任一生命周期阶段的企业低碳技术创新均有抑制效应，显性自利行为则在企业处于成熟期和衰退期时抑制低碳技术创新；机制分析表明，金融化在显性自利行为抑制低碳技术创新的过程中起非线性中介作用，隐性自利行为则通过加剧代理冲突及阻碍低碳注意力转入抑制低碳技术创新。研究结论为缓解管理者自利行为对企业低碳技术创新的抑制作用提供了政策参考和经验证据，对保障经济高质量发展和国家经济安全具有重要的战略意义。

关键词: 管理者自利行为, 低碳技术创新, 金融化, 代理冲突, 低碳注意力转移

Abstract: Enterprises are the main body of low-carbon technology innovation. Balancing the personal interests of enterprise managers with low-carbon technology innovation can effectively improve the level of low-carbon technology innovation in enterprises and help achieve the “dual carbon” goals. This paper takes high carbon emission enterprises listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share exchanges from 2012 to 2022 as samples, examines the impact of explicit and implicit binary self-interest behavior of managers on low-carbon technology innovation, explores the differential effects of different ownership properties and enterprise lifecycles, and characterizes the explicit and implicit binary mechanism of how manager self-interest behavior affects low-carbon technology innovation. The research results show that both explicit and implicit self-interest behaviors of managers can inhibit low-carbon technological innovation in enterprises, and this inhibitory effect has a lag effect; Both explicit and implicit self-interest behaviors of non-state-owned enterprise managers inhibit low-carbon technological innovation, while low-carbon technological innovation in state-owned enterprises is only influenced by implicit self-interest behaviors of managers; Implicit self-interest behavior has a suppressive effect on enterprises at any stage of their lifecycle, while explicit self-interest behavior suppresses low-carbon technological innovation when the enterprise is in its mature and declining stages; Mechanism analysis shows that financialization plays a non-linear mediating role in the process of explicit self-interest behavior inhibiting low-carbon technological innovation, while implicit self-interest behavior exacerbates agency conflicts and hinders low-carbon attention from turning to inhibiting low-carbon technological innovation. The research conclusion provides policy reference and empirical evidence to alleviate the inhibitory effect of managers’ self-interest behavior on low-carbon technological innovation in enterprises, and has important strategic significance for ensuring high-quality economic development and national industrial security.

Key words: manager’s self-interested behavior, low carbon technology innovation, financialization, agency conflicts, low carbon attention transfer