管理评论 ›› 2024, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (3): 185-196.

• 组织与战略管理 • 上一篇    

数字经济时代“专利黑代理”监管两阶段演化博弈研究

张俊艳1, 张芸苓1, 王迪2, 张晴1   

  1. 1. 天津大学管理与经济学部, 天津 300072;
    2. 山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 太原 030006
  • 收稿日期:2022-05-23 发布日期:2024-04-24
  • 作者简介:张俊艳,天津大学管理与经济学部教授,博士生导师,博士;张芸苓,天津大学管理与经济学部博士研究生;王迪,山西财经大学管理科学与工程学院讲师,博士;张晴,天津大学管理与经济学部博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学研究项目(21YJA630113)。

Two-stage Evolutionary Game Study on "Patent Unqualified Agency" in the Era of Digital Economy

Zhang Junyan1, Zhang Yunling1, Wang Di2, Zhang Qing1   

  1. 1. College of Management and Economy, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072;
    2. School of Management Science & Engineering, Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, Taiyuan 030006
  • Received:2022-05-23 Published:2024-04-24

摘要: 基于动态新协同监管理论构建了电商平台中"专利黑代理"监管的两阶段博弈模型,系统分析商户、电商平台、政府三方的博弈演化过程及其稳定策略,通过仿真模拟研究了规制"专利黑代理"行为的有效路径。结果表明:(1)没有政府参与的第一阶段博弈稳定策略不符合预期,第二阶段政府与平台协同监管后,三方博弈可以达到理想演化稳定状态;(2)政府参与下,提高电商平台专业性、政府"互联网+"监管的正确率、无资质代理罚款、电商约谈损失,可以促使三方博弈快速演化至理想稳定状态;(3)政府参与下,促使系统演化至理想稳定状态的最佳监管措施因监管对象而异,对于商户而言,直接监管比间接监管更为有效,对电商平台而言,事中监管比事后监管更有效。

关键词: 数字经济, 专利黑代理, 电商平台, 两阶段演化博弈

Abstract: A two-stage game model for the regulation of “patent unqualified agency” in e-commerce platforms is constructed based on the theory of dynamic new collaborative regulation. The game evolution process and stable strategies of merchants, e-commerce platforms, and the government are systematically analyzed. The effective path for regulating the behavior of “patent unqualified agency” is studied through simulation. The results indicate that: (1) the stability strategy of the first stage game without government participation does not meet expectations. In the second stage, after coordinated supervision between the government and the platform, the tripartite game can reach an ideal evolutionary stable state; (2) with the participation of the government, improving the professionalism of e-commerce platforms, the accuracy of government “Internet plus” regulation, fines for unqualified agents, and e-commerce interview losses can promote the rapid evolution of the tripartite game to an ideal stable state; (3) the best regulatory measures to promote the evolution of the system to an ideal stable state with government participation vary depending on the regulatory targets. For merchants, direct regulation is more effective than indirect regulation, and for e-commerce platforms, in-process regulation is more effective than post regulation.

Key words: digital economy, patent unqualified agency, e-commerce platforms, two-stage evolutionary game