众包竞赛中备选反馈对接包方参与行为的影响

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 众包竞赛中发包方作为需求方和决策主体，能够通过信息反馈影响接包方的参与行为。本文研究了一种新型反馈机制，即备选方案的设置如何影响后期接包方参与行为。从“猪八戒”网爬取了454个众包项目作为研究样本，为得到备选反馈带来的净效应，采用倾向得分匹配得到实验组与对照组，并设置时间序列以天数为单位，最终形成2698条非平衡面板数据，并构建双重差分模型进行实证分析。研究结果表明，发包方设置备选方案对后期接包方的参与意愿有负效应，且对技能水平低的接包方的负效应更大，但能提升单个接包方的平均提交数，即备选反馈会激励接包方做出更大的参赛努力。进一步考虑奖金吸引力、备选方案数和竞赛透明度对反馈效果的调节作用,发现奖金吸引力对反馈效果没有显著的调节作用，而备选方案数越少、竞赛透明度越高，反馈对接包方技能水平的影响越显著，但反馈对接包方参与意愿的作用效果并不受其影响。

关键词: 众包, 平台, 备选反馈, 倾向得分匹配, 双重差分模型

Abstract: In the crowdsourcing contests, the outsourcer, as the demand initiator and decision maker, can influence the participation behaviors of outsourcees through information feedback. This paper studies a novel feedback mechanism of how alternatives feedback influences outsourcees' participation behaviors later on. We collect 454 samples from the platform “Zhubajie”. In order to analyze the net effect, we obtain the experimental group (with alternatives) and control group (with no alternatives) by adopting the propensity score matching (PSM). At last, we get 2,698 unbalanced panel data in days. Based on these samples, we construct a difference-in-differences model, and the results suggest that alternatives feedback in process has a negative effect on outsourcees' willingness to participation, and the effect on low-skilled outsourcees is greater. However, the feedback can increase the average number of submissions of a single outsourcee, which indicates the feedback mechanism will motivate outsourcees to make greater efforts. In addition, after considering the moderating effects of prize attractiveness, the number of alternatives and transparency of contests, we find that prize attractiveness has no significant effect on feedback results, and by contrast, the less alternatives and the more transparent contest outsourcees face, the more significant effect feedback will have on outsourcees' skill level, but the effect of feedback on outsourcees' willingness to participation is not influenced by these factors.

Key words: crowdsourcing, platform, alternatives feedback, propensity score matching (PSM), difference-in-differences model (DID)

毕功兵, 黄慧娟, 徐扬. 众包竞赛中备选反馈对接包方参与行为的影响[J]. 管理评论, 2023, 35(6): 233-247.

Bi Gongbing, Huang Huijuan, Xu Yang. Impact of Alternatives Feedback on Participation Behavior of Outsourcees in the Crowdsourcing Contests[J]. Management Review, 2023, 35(6): 233-247.

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