管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (5): 267-279.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

随机需求下考虑零售商损失厌恶的双渠道供应链融资策略研究

王文隆1, 王梓豪2, 张涑贤2, 刘祺3   

  1. 1. 西北农林科技大学经济管理学院, 杨凌 712100;
    2. 西安建筑科技大学管理学院, 西安 710055;
    3. 西安交通大学管理学院, 西安 710049
  • 收稿日期:2020-11-19 出版日期:2023-05-28 发布日期:2023-06-21
  • 通讯作者: 张涑贤(通讯作者)，西安建筑科技大学管理学院教授，博士。
  • 作者简介:王文隆，西北农林科技大学经济管理学院副教授，硕士生导师，博士；王梓豪，西安建筑科技大学管理学院硕士研究生；刘祺，西安交通大学管理学院副研究员，硕士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目（72102185；72102176）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目（2452021113；2452021171；xpt012021029）；陕西省自然科学基础研究计划青年项目（2021JQ-518）。

Financing Strategy for a Dual-channel Supply Chain that Faces Loss-averse Retailers and Stochastic Demands

Wang Wenlong1, Wang Zihao2, Zhang Suxian2, Liu Qi3   

  1. 1. School of Economics & Management, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100;
    2. School of Management, Xi'an University of Architecture & Technology, Xi'an 710055;
    3. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049
  • Received:2020-11-19 Online:2023-05-28 Published:2023-06-21

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摘要： 针对随机需求情形下供应链融资策略问题，考虑资金约束零售商的损失厌恶态度，基于Stackelberg博弈分别构建了贸易信贷模型和银行信贷模型，分析了双渠道供应链的最优运营决策，并通过数值分析揭示了零售商的损失厌恶系数和初始资金对供应链运营决策和融资策略的影响。结果表明，零售商的最优订购量关于损失厌恶系数单调递减，且相比于贸易信贷，银行信贷下最优订购量的递减速度较大。损失厌恶系数较大时，零售商和制造商均偏向于银行信贷；反之，双方均偏向于贸易信贷。初始资金较大时，零售商和制造商均偏向于银行信贷；反之，制造商偏向于贸易信贷，零售商偏向于银行信贷，此时制造商可以通过将批发价格限定在一定区间来实现双渠道供应链的帕累托改进。此外，当消费者的零售渠道偏好较大时，银行信贷是双渠道供应链的均衡融资策略。当需求波动较小时，贸易信贷是双方的均衡融资策略。

关键词: 双渠道供应链, 损失厌恶, 资金约束, 贸易信贷, 银行信贷

Abstract: Financing strategies for a dual channel supply chain that faces stochastic demands and loss-averse and financially constrained retailers are studied. By using the Stackelberg game theory, we establish a trade credit model and a bank credit model and then analyze supply chain members' optimal operational decisions under the two financing models. Our numerical analysis reveals the impact of retailers' loss aversion coefficient and initial capital on their decisions. The results show that retailers' optimal order quantity decreases in line with their loss aversion coefficient, and the decline rate of optimal order quantity under bank credit is larger than that under trade credit. When the loss aversion coefficient is relatively large, retailers and manufacturers prefer bank credit. Otherwise, both sides prefer trade credit. When initial capital is relatively large, retailers and manufacturers prefer bank credit. Otherwise, manufacturers prefer trade credit and retailers prefer bank credit. In this case, manufacturers could achieve Pareto improvement of the dual-channel supply chain by limiting the wholesale price to a certain range. In addition, when consumers prefer retail channel, bank credit is an equilibrium financing strategy for a dual-channel supply chain. When demand fluctuation is small, trade credit is an equilibrium financing strategy for both parties.

Key words: dual-channel supply chain, loss-aversion, capital constraint, trade credit, bank credit