管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (8): 123-133.

• 技术与创新管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

权变型信息披露:外部融资对企业绿色创新平滑失效的新解释

王旭1, 杨有德2, 王兰3   

  1. 1. 山东财经大学工商管理学院, 济南 250014;
    2. 南京理工大学经济管理学院, 南京 210094;
    3. 南开大学商学院, 天津 300192
  • 收稿日期:2020-02-29 出版日期:2022-08-28 发布日期:2022-09-21
  • 通讯作者: 杨有德(通讯作者),南京理工大学经济管理学院博士研究生
  • 作者简介:王旭,山东财经大学工商管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;王兰,南开大学商学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金青年项目(71802117);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(18YJC630186);山东省社会科学规划研究项目(19CZKJ01)。

Privilege Information Disclosure: A New Explanation of External Financing’s Effect on the Lack of Green Innovation Drives in Enterprises

Wang Xu1, Yang Youde2, Wang Lan3   

  1. 1. School of Business Administration, Shandong University of Finance and Economics, Jinan 250014;
    2. School of Economics & Management, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094;
    3. School of Business, Nankai University, Tianjin 300192
  • Received:2020-02-29 Online:2022-08-28 Published:2022-09-21

摘要: 绿色创新是调和中国经济发展与环境保护之间尖锐矛盾的关键途径。然而,在非对称信息条件下,围绕绿色创新所形成的金融体系尚未充分发挥其创新平滑作用。基于信息披露视角,本文匹配了制造业上市公司绿色专利与信息披露数据,利用门槛模型,重点探讨信息披露在外部融资对绿色创新驱动过程中的影响。研究发现,信息披露在债权融资与政府补贴对绿色创新的影响过程中具有显著的门槛效应,说明信息披露过低引发的管理层机会主义和投资者监督乏力,是造成外部融资对绿色创新平滑失效的重要前因。相较而言,股权融资对绿色创新的驱动作用并不依赖于企业信息披露;信息披露对外部融资的促进作用具有“双刃剑”效应,当信息披露超过第二门槛阈值时,债权融资与政府补贴的促进效应减弱。表明信息披露过高引发的技术溢出,损害了投资者对绿色创新收益排他性的预期;信息披露的门槛效应遵循产权制度逻辑,相较于国有企业,投资者对民营企业绿色创新的评估与治理,更加依赖于企业信息披露。本文有利于打开外部融资驱动企业绿色创新的作用“黑箱”,能够有效阐释创新融资理论的研究悖论,为中国企业实现绿色发展提供科学依据。

关键词: 绿色创新, 外部融资, 信息披露, 门槛效应

Abstract: Green innovation is an important way to reconcile the contradiction between the economic development and the environmental protection in China. However, under the condition of asymmetric information, the financial system formed around green innovation has not fully exerted its smoothing effect. Based on the perspective of information disclosure, this paper draws upon the green patent and information disclosure data of listed manufacturing companies and uses the threshold model to analyze the influence mechanism of information disclosure in the process of external financing driving green innovation. The study finds that information disclosure has a significant threshold effect in the process of debt financing and government subsidies driving green innovation, indicating that management opportunism and weak investor supervision caused by low information disclosure are key factors that cause external financing to smooth the failure of green innovation. In contrast, the role of equity financing in driving green innovation does not depend on corporate information disclosure; the role of information disclosure in promoting external financing has a “double-edged sword” effect. When information disclosure exceeds the second threshold, debt financing and the promotion effect of government subsidies weaken. This indicates that the technology spillover caused by excessive information disclosure has damaged investors’ expectations of the exclusiveness of green innovation income. The threshold effect of informatio n disclosure follows the logic of the property rights system. Compared with state-owned enterprises, investors’ assessment and governance of green innovation in private enterprises are more dependent on corporate information disclosure. The findings above, conducive to opening the “black box” regarding what a role external financing plays in driving green innovation in enterprises, can effectively explain the research paradox of innovative financing theory and provide a scientific basis for Chinese companies to achieve green development.

Key words: green innovation, external financing, information disclosure, threshold effect