家族控制异质性、制度空隙与企业创新

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 中国家族企业历经40多年的发展，家族控制随着外在制度环境发展、家族内部变迁和家族企业成长表现出异质性特征。在不同的控制方式下，家族企业的创新行为有何差异？本文从家族控制异质性特征视角，将家族企业控制权分为股权控制、战略控制以及全面控制，考察控制异质性对企业创新活动的不同影响，探索构建一个家族控制异质性影响企业创新行为的理论框架。研究发现：相比较股权控制和战略控制，全面控制的家族企业更可能进行研发创新；相比较股权控制，战略控制的家族企业更可能进行研发创新；家族全面控制对企业创新行为的影响在制度空隙严重的地区更为显著。地区的制度空隙越小，家族股东加强家族控制以补偿正式制度缺失的需求越低，有助于家族企业引入外部职业经理人、实现现代化管理。进一步研究发现，家族全面控制通过缓和两类代理问题、提高企业风险承担水平等机制促进企业创新。本文在以往家族涉入的分析研究框架的基础上，从异质性角度剖析家族企业不同类型的控制方式，深化了家族涉入对企业行为影响的研究，为家族企业治理提供了新的研究视角。在此基础上，立足我国转轨经济的制度空隙特征，考察不同控制类型的家族企业的创新活动，补充了家族企业创新的文献，揭开了家族企业创新的“黑箱”。

关键词: 家族企业, 控制异质性, 制度空隙, 企业创新

Abstract: Over the past more than 40 years, Chinese family firms have experienced external institutional evolution, internal changes and significnat growth. In this process, heterogeneity has gradually characterized family control. In order to explore how they will innovate under differnt family control modes, we divide, from the perspective of control heterogeneity, family firm control into three types: equity control, strategic control and full control. This paper explores and investigates the different influences of control heterogeneity on corporate innovation activities. The research findings are as follows. Compared with equity-controlled and strategically controlled family firms, fully controlled family firms are more likely to carry out innovation activities. Compared with equity-controlled family firms, strategically controlled family firms are more likely to carry out innovation activities. The influence of full family control on corporate innovation is more significant in regions with large institutional voids. The smaller the institution voids in regions, the smaller the gap between family managers and professional managers. Narrowing the institutional voids may reduce family control and improve the degree of family professionalism. Additional analysis shows that full control can promote corporate innovation by alleviating two kinds of agency problems and improving the level of corporate risk-taking. Breaking through the previous analysis and research framework of family involvement, this paper analyzes different types of control in family firms, which not only deepens the research about the influence of family involvement on corporate behavior, but also provides a new research perspective for family firm governance. In addition, based on the institutional void characteristics of China’s transitional economy, we investigate the innovative activities in family firm of different control types, which supplement the literature on family firm innovation and reveal the “black box” of family firm innovation.

Key words: family firms, the heterogeneity of family control, institutional void, corporate innovation

陈德球, 林程杰, 徐婷. 家族控制异质性、制度空隙与企业创新[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(4): 62-79.

Chen Deqiu, Lin Chengjie, Xu Ting. The Heterogeneity of Family Control, Institutional Void and Corporate Innovation[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(4): 62-79.

参考文献

[1] Gómez-Mejía L. R., Haynes K. T., Núñez-Nickel M., et al. Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risk in Family-Controlled Firms:Evidence from Spanish Olive Oil Mills[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 2007,52(1):106-137
[2] Duran P., Kammerlander N., Van Essen M., et al. Doing More with Less:Innovation Input and Output in Family Firms[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2016,59(4):1224-1264
[3] Bennedsen M., Pérez-González F., Wolfenzon D. The Governance of Family Firms[J]. Corporate Governance:A Synthesis of Theory, Research, and Practice, 2010,(8):371-389
[4] 朱沆,Eric Kushins,周影辉.社会情感财富抑制了中国家族企业的创新投入吗?[J].管理世界, 2016,(3):99-114
[5] 黄海杰,吕长江,朱晓文.二代介入与企业创新——来自中国家族上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论, 2018,21(1):6-16
[6] Berrone P., Cruz C., Gómez-Mejía L., et al. Socioemotional Wealth in Family Firms:Theoretical Dimensions, Assessment Approaches, and Agenda for Future Research[J]. Family Business Review, 2012,25(3):258-279
[7] Klein S. B., Astrachan J. H., Smyrnios K. X. The F-PEC Scale of Family Influence:Construction, Validation, and Further Implication for Theory[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2005,29(3):321-340
[8] 廖开容,陈爽英.制度环境对民营企业研发投入影响的实证研究[J].科学学研究, 2011,29(9):1342-1348
[9] March J. G., Shapira Z. Variable Risk Preferences and the Focus of Attention[J]. Psychological Review, 1992,99(1):172-183
[10] Levinthal D. A. Random Walks and Organizational Mortality[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1991,36(3):397-420
[11] Gomez-Mejia L. R., Cruz C., Berrone P., et al. The Bind that Ties:Socioemotional Wealth Preservation in Family Firms[J]. Academy of Management Annals, 2011,5(1):653-707
[12] Le Breton-Miller I., Miller D. Socioemotional Wealth across the Family Firm Life Cycle:A Commentary on "Family Business Survival and the Role of Boards"[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2013,37(6):1391-1397
[13] Luo X. R., Chung C. N. Filling or Abusing the Institutional Void?Ownership and Management Control of Public Family Businesses in an Emerging Market[J]. Organization Science, 2013,24(2):591-613
[14] Fama E. F., Jensen M. C. Separation of Ownership and Control[J]. The Journal of Law&Economics, 1983,26(2):301-325
[15] Jiang F., Shi W., Zheng X. Board Chairs and R&D Investment:Evidence from Chinese Family-Controlled Firms[J]. Journal of Business Research, 2020,112:109-118
[16] Miller D., Le Breton-Miller I. Deconstructing Socioemotional Wealth[J]. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2014,38(4):713-720
[17] Johnson S., La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F., et al. Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review, 2000,90(2):22-27
[18] La Porta R., Lopez-De-Silanes F., Shleifer A. Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World[J]. The Journal of Finance, 2000,55(1):1-33
[19] Lins K. V., Volpin P., Wagner H. F. Does Family Control Matter?International Evidence from the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis[J]. The Review of Financial Studies, 2013,26(10):2583-2619
[20] Liu Q., Luo T., Tian G. G. Family Control and Corporate Cash Holdings:Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2015,31:220-245
[21] Nelson T. The Persistence of Founder Influence:Management, Ownership, and Performance Effects at Initial Public Offering[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2003,24(8):707-724
[22] Wasserman N. Stewards, Agents, and the Founder Discount:Executive Compensation in New Ventures[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2006,49(5):960-976
[23] 夏立军,郭建展,陆铭.企业家的"政由己出"——民营IPO公司创始人管理、市场环境与公司业绩[J].管理世界, 2012,(9):132-141
[24] Ma L., Ma S., Tian G. Political Connections, Founder-Managers, and Their Impact on Tunneling in China's Listed Firms[J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2013,24:312-339
[25] Stein Jeremy C. Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1988,96(1):61-80
[26] North D. C., Weingast B. R. Constitutions and Commitment:The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England[J]. The Journal of Economic History, 1989,49(4):803-832
[27] Meyer K. E., Estrin S., Bhaumik S. K., et al. Institutions, Resources, and Entry Strategies in Emerging Economies[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 2009,30(1):61-80
[28] Khanna T., Palepu K. G. Why Focused Strategies may Be Wrong for Emerging Markets[J]. Harvard Business Review, 1997,75(4):41-51
[29] Khanna T., Palepu K. G. Winning in Emerging Markets:A Road Map for Strategy and Execution[M]. Brighton:Harvard Business School Press Books, 2010
[30] Peng M. W., Jiang Y. Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms[J]. Journal of Management Studies, 2010,47(2):253-273
[31] Hoskisson R. E., Eden L., Law C. M., et al. Strategy in Emerging Economies[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 2000,43(3):249-267
[32] Miller D., Lee J., Chang S., et al. Filling the Institutional Void:The Social Behavior and Performance of Family vs Non-Family Technology Firms in Emerging Markets[J]. Journal of International Business Studies, 2013,40(5):802-817
[33] 苏启林,朱文.上市公司家族控制与企业价值[J].经济研究, 2003,(8):36-45
[34] 贺小刚,连燕玲.家族权威与企业价值:基于家族上市公司的实证研究[J].经济研究, 2009,44(4):90-102
[35] Tian X., Wang T. Y. Tolerance for Failure and Corporate Innovation[J]. The Review of Financial Studies, 2014,27(1):211-255
[36] 王小鲁,樊纲,余静文.中国分省份市场化指数报告[M].北京:社会科学文献出版社, 2016
[37] 黄俊,陈信元.集团化经营与企业研发投资——基于知识溢出与内部资本市场视角的分析[J].经济研究, 2011,46(6):80-92
[38] 高凤莲,王志强.独立董事个人社会资本异质性的治理效应研究[J].中国工业经济, 2016,(3):146-160
[39] 李姝,翟士运,古朴.非控股股东参与决策的积极性与企业技术创新[J].中国工业经济, 2018,(7):155-173
[40] 魏明海,黄琼宇,程敏英.家族企业关联大股东的治理角色——基于关联交易的视角[J].管理世界, 2013,(3):133-147
[41] Covin J. G., Slevin D. P. Strategic Management of Small Firms in Hostile and Benign Environments[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1989,10(1):75-87
[42] Miller D., Kets de Vries. M. F. R., Toulouse J. M. Top Executive Locus of Control and Its Relationship to Strategy-Making, Structure and Environment[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1982,25(2):237-253
[43] Boubakri N., Cosset J. C., Saffar W. The Role of State and Foreign Owners in Corporate Risk-taking:Evidence form Privatization[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2013,108(3):641-658
[44] 张敏,童丽静,许浩然.社会网络与企业风险承担——基于我国上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界, 2015,(11):161-171