管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (3): 290-301.

• 公共管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

奖惩机制和游客参与下的低价游监管——基于三方演化博弈视角

范春梅, 吴阳, 李华强   

  1. 1. 西南交通大学经济管理学院, 成都 610031;
    2. 西南交通大学公共管理学院, 成都 610031
  • 出版日期:2022-03-28 发布日期:2022-04-20
  • 通讯作者: 李华强（通讯作者），西南交通大学公共管理学院教授
  • 作者简介:范春梅，西南交通大学经济管理学院副教授;吴阳，西南交通大学经济管理学院硕士研究生
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目(19XZZ007);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(18YJC630028;17YJC630056);四川省科技计划软科学研究项目(2019JDR0207;2019JDR0351);成都市哲学社会科学规划项目(2020ZXA04)。

Low-price Tour Regulation under the Reward-Punishment Mechanism and Tourist Participation ——A Perspective of Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Fan Chunmei, Wu Yang, Li Huaqiang   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031;
    2. School of Public Administration, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031
  • Online:2022-03-28 Published:2022-04-20

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摘要： 针对低价游屡禁不绝的现象,构建奖惩机制和游客参与下地接社、游客和政府的三方演化博弈模型,并借助NetLogo平台进行仿真分析。研究发现:(1)政府对地接社采取的惩罚力度越高,地接社选择低价接团的比例越少,但只提高惩罚力度并不能促使其演化为正常接团。(2)地接社低价接团被投诉后,需对游客予以补偿,提高补偿力度有助于提升游客投诉积极性从而抑制地接社低价接团。(3)政府对地接社的补贴存在一个合理区间,小于该区间的补贴力度不能促进地接社演化为正常接团,而大于该区间的补贴力度将导致政府负担加重,不利于系统的整体优化。(4)游客投诉能提升地接社演化为正常接团的速度,而政府对游客投诉的奖励力度需达到一定比例才能明显提升游客的投诉积极性。

关键词: 低价游, 政府监管, 奖惩机制, 演化博弈, NetLogo仿真

Abstract: This paper aims to explore the low-price tour regulation under a reward-punishment mechanism and tourist participation by establishing a dynamic evolutionary game model among the local tour operators, tourists and the government. The model is calculated and simulated in the NetLogo platform. Findings suggest that: (1) If the government imposes higher penalty on illegal local tour operators, less local tour operators would choose low-rice tour groups. However, simply intensifying the penalties does not make it sure for local tour operators to choose normal-price tour groups. (2) When tourists complain about the service of the low-price tour groups, the illegal local tour operators should compensate the tourists. Increasing the compensation will motivate tourists to make complaints and thus would inhibit the low-price tour. (3) The subsidy provided by the government to local tour operators should be in the range (v1,v2). Any subsidy below v1 is not attractive enough for local travel operators to choose normal-price tour groups, while any subsidy above v2 would increase the financial burden of the government, so any subsidy beyond the range is not conducive to the overall optimization of the system. (4) Tourists’ complaints can make it a trend for local tour operators to choose normal-price tour groups. When the government’ incentives for tourists’ complaints reach a certain level, tourists’ complaint motivation will be improved significantly.

Key words: low-price tour, government regulation, reward-punishment mechanism, evolutionary game, NetLogo simulation