交叉持股、企业竞争与双向进入遏制

管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (12): 73-85.

交叉持股、企业竞争与双向进入遏制

马洪坤¹, 曾辰航², 李仲飞^3,4

1. 珠海华发投资控股集团有限公司, 横琴 519031;
2. 中南财经政法大学文澜学院, 武汉 430073;
3. 南方科技大学商学院, 深圳 518055;
4. 中山大学管理学院, 广州 510275

收稿日期:2020-05-08 出版日期:2022-12-28 发布日期:2023-01-16
通讯作者: 李仲飞(通讯作者),南方科技大学商学院讲席教授,博士。
作者简介:马洪坤,珠海华发投资控股集团有限公司研究员,博士;曾辰航,中南财经政法大学文澜学院副教授,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金创新研究群体项目(71721001);国家自然科学基金重大项目(71991474);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72103210);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(20YJA790001);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(18YJC790115)。

Cross-holdings, Competition and Bi-direction Entry-deterrence

Ma Hongkun¹, Zeng Chenhang², Li Zhongfei^3,4

1. Zhuhai Huafa Investment Holdings Group Co. Ltd., Hengqin 519031;
2. Wenlan School of Business, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073;
3. School of Business, Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen 518055;
4. School of Business, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275

Received:2020-05-08 Online:2022-12-28 Published:2023-01-16

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 交叉持股使相关企业利润关联性增强,影响企业的产量竞争,进而也会影响潜在竞争企业的市场进入决策以及在位企业的进入遏制行为。本文基于序贯博弈模型和市场进入模型,考虑位于两个独立市场上的企业均有动机进入对方市场谋求竞争收益的情形。借助逆向归纳法和均衡分析法,本文得到在位企业和潜在进入企业之间可以通过交叉持股协议有效地实现对彼此的进入遏制,从而维持在位企业的市场势力。这是对产业组织理论中传统进入遏制方法的有力补充,也为竞争与反垄断政策的研究与制定等奠定了重要的微观理论基础。

关键词: 交叉持股, 进入遏制, 古诺竞争, 联合利润, 市场均衡

Abstract: Cross-holdings will enhance the correlation of firms’ profits, which inevitably affects firms’ quantity competition and further changes the entry decision of the entrant firm together with the deterrence strategy of the incumbent firm. Based on sequential-game model and market entry model, we build up a two-period market entry model in which two firms in two separated markets intend to enter each other’s market to make profits. By backward induction and equilibrium analysis, this paper finds that, in equilibrium, the incumbent strategically offers the potential entrant a contract with positive bilateral cross-holdings to maintain monopoly, which results in a maximum joint profit for both firms. In this way, the entrant firm accepts the contract and stays out. Our results will be a powerful supplement to the traditional approach of entry-deterrence in the industrial organization theory, and also lay an important micro theoretical foundation for the research and formulation of competition and anti-monopoly policies.

Key words: cross-holdings, entry-deterrence, Cournot competition, joint profits, market equilibrium

马洪坤, 曾辰航, 李仲飞. 交叉持股、企业竞争与双向进入遏制[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(12): 73-85.

Ma Hongkun, Zeng Chenhang, Li Zhongfei. Cross-holdings, Competition and Bi-direction Entry-deterrence[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(12): 73-85.

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