管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (12): 173-183.

• 市场营销 • 上一篇    下一篇

经销商“抱团”如何影响制造商的信息支持和合同监督?

赵星宇1,2, 庄贵军1, 丰超1   

  1. 1. 西安交通大学管理学院, 西安 710049;
    2. 西安理工大学经济与管理学院, 西安 710054
  • 收稿日期:2020-03-24 出版日期:2022-12-28 发布日期:2023-01-16
  • 通讯作者: 庄贵军(通讯作者),西安交通大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 作者简介:赵星宇,西安交通大学管理学院,博士,西安理工大学经济与管理学院讲师;丰超,西安交通大学管理学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金面上项目(72072141;71472149)。

How does Distributors’ “Banding Together” Affect Information Favoring and Contract Supervision of Manufacturers

Zhao Xingyu1,2, Zhuang Guijun1, Feng Chao1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710054
  • Received:2020-03-24 Online:2022-12-28 Published:2023-01-16

摘要: 基于社会网络理论和渠道行为相关文献,研究了经销商“抱团”(网络密度)对制造商渠道行为及其后果的影响,并探讨了行业环境不确定性的调节作用。研究结果显示:第一,经销商网络密度对制造商的信息支持和合同监督均有正向影响;第二,行业环境不确定性弱化了经销商网络密度对信息支持的正向影响,但对经销商网络密度与合同监督之间的关系没有显著影响;第三,信息支持有助于降低渠道冲突水平、抑制经销商投机行为,合同监督有助于抑制经销商投机行为,但对渠道冲突没有显著影响。

关键词: 网络密度, 信息支持, 合同监督, 渠道冲突, 投机行为

Abstract: Based on social network theory and the literature of marketing channel behavior, this paper examines the impact of distributors’ “banding together” (represented by network density) on the behaviors of manufacturer and their consequences, and tests the moderating effects of industrial environment uncertainty. The results show that, first, network intensity of grouped distributors positively affects information favoring and contract supervision of manufacturers; second, industrial environment uncertainty weakens the positive effects of network density of grouped distributors on information favoring of manufacturers, but has no significant impact on the relationship between network density of grouped distributors and contract supervision of manufacturers. Third, information favoring of manufacturers in turn declines the level of channel conflict, and inhibits opportunism of distributors, while contract supervision of manufacturers in turn inhibits opportunism of distributors, but has no significant effect on channel conflict.

Key words: network intensity, information favoring, contract supervision, channel conflict, opportunism