管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (4): 160-169.

• 电子商务与信息管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

服务成本信息不完全下的SaaS云外包合约研究

唐国锋1, 李丹2, 艾兴政3   

  1. 1. 重庆工商大学管理科学与工程学院, 重庆 400067;
    2. 西南政法大学经济学院, 重庆 401120;
    3. 电子科技大学经济与管理学院, 成都 611731
  • 收稿日期:2018-04-16 出版日期:2021-04-28 发布日期:2021-05-06
  • 通讯作者: 唐国锋（通讯作者），重庆工商大学管理科学与工程学院副教授，博士，博士后
  • 作者简介:李丹，西南政法大学经济学院讲师，博士，博士后；艾兴政，电子科技大学经济与管理学院教授，博士生导师，博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金项目（18XGL005）。

Research on SaaS Cloud Outsourcing Contract under Incomplete Cost Information

Tang Guofeng1, Li Dan2, Ai Xingzheng3   

  1. 1. School of Managment Science and Engineering, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067;
    2. School of Economics, Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing 401120;
    3. School of Economics and Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology, Chengdu 611731
  • Received:2018-04-16 Online:2021-04-28 Published:2021-05-06

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摘要： 客户企业在实施SaaS云外包时，面临因云服务提供商（cloud service provider，CSP）成本结构信息不完全所带来的风险。针对CSP成本结构中服务质量可验证，而效率参数不可观测所引发的不完全信息问题，以客户企业期望收益最大化为目标，设计外包合约激励CSP显示真实成本结构信息，提供最优服务质量及努力水平，并与完全信息下的外包合约激励效果进行比较分析。研究表明，客户企业在设计外包合约时，效率参数较高情况下，可忽略CSP的激励相容约束，反之参与约束；效率参数较高时CSP的边际成本不低于效率参数较低时CSP的边际成本，其服务质量不高于效率参数较低时CSP提供的服务质量；效率参数较高时，不完全信息下CSP提供的最优努力水平、服务质量，以及所获得的服务报酬均不高于完全信息下的取值；效率参数较低时，CSP提供的服务质量及努力水平与完全信息下相同，客户企业向CSP支付的服务报酬不低于完全信息下的服务报酬。

关键词: CSP（云服务提供商）, 效率参数, 服务质量, 不完全信息, 合约设计

Abstract: There exists risk caused by incomplete cost information of CSP (cloud service provider) when customer enterprise is carrying out SaaS(Software as a service) cloud outsourcing. Focused on the incomplete information problem caused by the unobserved efficiency parameter in cost structure of CSP, although the service quality is verifiable, the contract is designed to induce CSP show the real cost structure information and provide the optimal service quality, effort, and the contract incentive effect is finally compared with complete information. The conclusions imply that the incentive compatibility constraint of CSP with higher efficiency parameter and the participation constraint of CSP with lower efficiency parameter can be ignored when the outsourcing contract is designed; the marginal cost of CSP with higher efficiency parameter is not lower than the CSP with lower efficiency parameter, otherwise, the service quality performs to the opposite; the optimal service quality and effort of CSP with higher efficiency parameter under incomplete information is not higher than the service quality and effort under complete information, the service payment performs to the same; the optimal service quality and effort of CSP with lower efficiency parameter under incomplete information are the same as the service quality and effort under complete information, and the service payment under incomplete information is not lower than the service payment under complete information.

Key words: cloud service provider (CSP), efficiency parameter, service quality, incomplete information, contract design