税收激进度、外部监督机制与非标准审计意见

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 文章利用中国A股非金融类上市公司2008—2015年数据，同时以节税水平、会计-税收差异以及剔除应计项目影响的会计-税收差异度量税收激进度，考察了税收激进度对审计师出具非标审计意见倾向的影响。结果发现，总体而言，税收激进度对审计师出具非标意见的倾向并没有显著影响，但机构投资者持股和分析师跟踪这两种外部监督机制可以显著负向调节税收激进度对审计意见的影响，而地区法治水平则会显著增强税收激进度对审计意见的正向影响。进一步研究表明，机构投资者持股和分析师跟踪的负向调节作用仅存在于法治水平较低地区公司中。

关键词: 税收激进度, 机构投资者, 分析师跟踪, 法律环境, 审计意见

Abstract: Using the data of Chinese A-share listed non-financial companies in the period of 2007-2015, this paper investigates the effect of tax aggressiveness (measured by difference between the statutory corporate income tax rate and ETR, book-tax difference, and the Desai-Dharmapala measure of book-tax differences) on auditor's propensity to issue modified audit opinions (thereafter MAO). The results show that there is no significant association in general between tax aggressiveness and MAO. When external monitoring mechanisms (represented by institutional holding and analyst coverage) are effective, however, the association of tax aggressiveness and MAO will be negatively moderated. On the contrary, legal environment can positively moderate the association between tax aggressiveness and MAO. Further tests show that the negative moderating role of institutional holding and analyst coverage only exists when the legal environment is weak.

Key words: tax aggressiveness, institutional investor, analyst following, legal environment, audit opinion

刘笑霞, 李明辉. 税收激进度、外部监督机制与非标准审计意见[J]. 管理评论, 2020, 32(6): 280-291.

Liu Xiaoxia, Li Minghui. Tax Aggressiveness, External Monitoring and Modified Audit Opinion[J]. Management Review, 2020, 32(6): 280-291.

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