管理评论 ›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (6): 150-162.

• 技术与创新管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

产-学研协同创新的随机演化博弈分析

贺一堂, 谢富纪   

  1. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院, 上海 200030
  • 收稿日期:2017-09-19 发布日期:2020-07-10
  • 作者简介:贺一堂,上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,博士;谢富纪,上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(15JZD017);国家自然科学基金项目(71373158)。

Stochastic Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Industry-University-Institute Collaboration Innovation

He Yitang, Xie Fuji   

  1. Antai College of Economics&Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200030
  • Received:2017-09-19 Published:2020-07-10

摘要: 本文运用随机演化博弈的方法,分析了产-学研协同创新演进过程中的稳定状况及收敛速度。在随机动力系统下,博弈双方努力程度分布会出现如下状况:博弈方群体中的收益较高的那部分成员在随机演化过程中呈现出不稳定性,而收益较低的那部分成员在随机演化过程中则是稳定的。案例分析表明,恰恰是这种不稳定性促成了演进速度的提升,使得博弈方成员能够有效而快速地向着较优的方向演进。

关键词: 随机演化博弈, 随机微分方程, 稳定性, 产-学研协同创新

Abstract: Based on the stochastic evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the stability and the convergence rate of the industry-university-institute collaboration innovation process, followed by a series of numerical examples to exemplify the corresponding results. In the stochastic dynamic system, the probability density distribution of the efforts of both sides is as follows:instability occurs among the members whose revenue is higher, whereas stability occurs among the members whose revenue is lower. However, the case analysis indicates that it is the instability that accelerates the pace of evolution so that members can converge to better status effectively and quickly.

Key words: stochastic evolutionary game, stochastic differential equation (SDE), stability, collaboration innovation