管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (12): 273-282.

• 应急管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

资源有限及利益相关影响下的安全监管演化博弈分析

马艳红1, 赵秋红2, 吴成锋3   

  1. 1. 北京信息科技大学经济管理学院, 北京 100192;
    2. 北京航空航天大学经济管理学院, 北京 100191;
    3. 青岛科技大学经济与管理学院, 青岛 266061
  • 收稿日期:2018-10-10 出版日期:2020-12-28 发布日期:2020-12-30
  • 通讯作者: 吴成锋(通讯作者),青岛科技大学经济与管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士
  • 作者简介:马艳红,北京信息科技大学经济管理学院讲师,博士;赵秋红,北京航空航天大学经济管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目（91224007）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目（16YJC630135）；国家重点研发计划（2017YFF0211501；2018YFF0215701）；山东省社会科学规划研究项目（19BJCJ10）；北京信息科技大学促进高校内涵发展——科研重点研究培育项目（5211910930）。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Safety Supervision with Limited Resources and Benefit Dependency

Ma Yanhong1, Zhao Qiuhong2, Wu Chengfeng3   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Information Science and Technology University, Beijing 100192;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing 100191;
    3. College of Economics and Management, Qingdao University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266061
  • Received:2018-10-10 Online:2020-12-28 Published:2020-12-30

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摘要： 本文考虑地方政府与生产企业的利益相关性，并考虑资源有限时企业安全投入对其生产收益的影响，构建了安全监管的演化博弈模型，给出了其演化稳定策略并分析了博弈相关参数对演化稳定策略的影响。研究结果表明，企业获得的安全投入激励对单阶段博弈均衡解有影响，但对演化稳定策略无影响；当事故发生带来的损失相对较低时，增大对企业的违规惩罚有助于降低生产事故发生的概率；企业的强制安全投入成本越高，事故发生概率越高；增强地方政府与企业的经济利益关系有助于使企业的稳定策略由不投入转为投入，进而可以降低事故发生的概率。本文研究成果可以指导政府设置安全监管相关参数，有助于降低事故发生概率、提高生产安全管理水平。

关键词: 安全投入, 安全监管, 演化博弈, 资源有限, 利益相关

Abstract: In this paper, an evolutionary game model between safety investment by the company and safety supervision by the local government is built. In the model, the impact of safety investment by the company on production profit is considered. Also, the interest relationship between the company and local government is modeled through considering tax ratio. The evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is given and the impact of government regulation parameters, including safety investment reward, penalty, mandatory safety investment cost and tax ratio on the evolutionary stable strategy, is analyzed. The impact of the parameters indicates that safety investment reward does not affect the evolutionary stable strategy and the penalty can impel the company to invest in safety measures when the accident loss is relatively low. The increase of mandatory safety investment cost can decrease the company's safety investment probability and also the government's safety supervision probability. The stronger the interest relationship between local government and the company is, the higher the probability that the company invests in safety measures and the lower the accident probability. The results of this paper can help reduce accident probability and improve safety management level through guiding the government to set safety supervision related parameters.

Key words: safety investment, safety supervision, evolutionary game, limited resources, benefit dependency