管理评论 ›› 2020, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (12): 253-262.

• 物流与供应链管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

竞争还是合作?——考虑顾客异质质量偏好下的双寡头企业均衡策略研究

曾能民1, 曾冬玲2, 何青3   

  1. 1. 哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院, 哈尔滨 150001;
    2. 重庆师范大学数学学院, 重庆 401331;
    3. 衡阳师范学院经济与管理系, 衡阳 421002
  • 收稿日期:2017-12-14 出版日期:2020-12-28 发布日期:2020-12-30
  • 通讯作者: 何青(通讯作者),衡阳师范学院经济与管理系副教授,博士
  • 作者简介:曾能民,哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院副教授,博士;曾冬玲,重庆师范大学硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72001057);国家社科基金重点项目(19AGL007;20AJY016);教育部人文社科项目(19YJC630052);黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(LH2020G003);黑龙江省哲学社会科学研究规划项目(18GLD291;20GLC205);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(3072020CFT0907;3072020CFW0909;3072020CFT2402)。

Compete or Cooperate? Equilibrium for Duopoly Manufacturers under Heterogeneous Market

Zeng Nengmin1, Zeng Dongling2, He Qing3   

  1. 1. School of Economics and Management, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001;
    2. School of Mathematics, Chongqing Normal University, Chongqing 401331;
    3. School of Economics and Management, Hengyang Normal University, Hengyang 421002
  • Received:2017-12-14 Online:2020-12-28 Published:2020-12-30

摘要: 本文研究了具有产品质量差异的双寡头制造企业之间的竞争与合作问题,其中一个制造商是垂直一体化企业,它既可以制造零件也可以制造产品,另一个制造商则需从外部采购零件以制造产品。在考虑潜在供货合作的前提下,构建了顾客具有异质质量偏好的双寡头竞争模型,采用逆向归纳法求出了动态博弈的均衡结果。研究发现,竞争与合作既可能共存,也可能互斥。具体地,若该行业的成本参数较低,则两个制造商会在上游达成供货合作而在终端市场进行产品竞争,即竞争与合作共存。若该行业的成本参数较高(因质量优势而引起的成本劣势很大),则当垂直一体化制造商的产品质量比对手更低时,它会定一个较低的价格把对手挤出市场,即竞争排斥合作;当它的产品质量比对手更高时,它倾向于做纯粹的供应商而把市场完全让渡给对手,即合作排斥竞争。

关键词: 供应链, 竞争, 合作, 质量, 异质偏好

Abstract: This paper investigates the decision equilibrium for duopoly manufacturers (M1 and M2) who produce vertically differentiated products and compete in the market where the customers have heterogeneous preferences for the quality of products. M2 can produce components of final products by itself, whereas M1 has to rely on the components from its rivals or other suppliers. No matter whom M1 purchases from, there is identical unit sourcing cost. The results show that M2 always agrees to supply components for M2 and M2 always selects its rivals as the supplier. However, it does not mean that cooperation certainly occurs, because M1 may be pushed out of the market by M2 under price competition. In fact, in equilibrium, competition and cooperation either coexist with or exclude each other. Specifically, when the cost parameter of the industry is small, the manufacturers cooperate with each other on component supply in upstream and fight for market share in downstream; that is, competition coexists with cooperation. When the cost parameter is large (the cost disadvantage caused by quality advantage is large), M2 either pushes M1 out of the market by setting a low price (namely, competition excluding cooperation) if M2 has a lower product quality than its rivals, or only supplies components for M1 and hands the market to its rival (namely, cooperation excluding competition) if the opposite is the case.

Key words: supply chain, competition, cooperation, quality, heterogeneous preference