管理评论

›› 2019, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (8): 210-218.

• 会计与财务管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

标准成本内部定价、可比绩效与动态激励

崔健波1,2, 罗正英1   

  1. 1. 苏州大学东吴商学院, 苏州 215006;
    2. 江苏科技大学经济管理学院, 镇江 212003
  • 收稿日期:2016-12-16 出版日期:2019-08-28 发布日期:2019-09-11
  • 作者简介:崔健波,江苏科技大学经济管理学院讲师,博士,苏州大学东吴商学院在站博士后;罗正英,苏州大学东吴商学院教授,博士生导师。
  • 基金资助:

    江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目（2014ZDIXM033）；江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学研究项目（2017SJB1093）。

Internal Pricing Based on Standard Cost, Comparative Performance and Dynamic Incentives

Cui Jianbo1,2, Luo Zhengying1   

  1. 1. Dongwu Business School, Soochow University, Suzhou 215006;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang 212003
  • Received:2016-12-16 Online:2019-08-28 Published:2019-09-11

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摘要：

以标准成本作为公司内部交易的转移价格，上游卖方部门预期到下期采用的标准成本可能会随上期实现的实际成本的减少而减少。转移价格随之要下降，上游缺乏控制成本的激励，棘轮效应产生。为抑制该问题，引入可比绩效，构建两阶段动态激励模型，分析发现：在形成第二阶段预期时，可比绩效信息如果导致第一阶段实现的成本上被赋予的权数减少，引入可比绩效信息会弱化棘轮效应；如果导致被赋予的权数增加，引入可比绩效信息则会强化棘轮效应。

关键词: 标准成本, 棘轮效应, 可比绩效, 动态激励

Abstract:

Standard cost is commonly used as transfer price of inside trade in a company when market price is absent. When upstream sellers predict that standard cost of next period may decrease due to decline of actual cost of prior period and subsequently, transfer price may decline, they will not have motivation to control cost. This is why ratchet effect occurs. To address this problem, this paper designs a 2-stage dynamic incentive model. It shows that ratchet effects would be thwarted after comparative performance information being introduced if the weight on the realized cost of first stage decreases while expectation about cost of second stage is forming. Otherwise, it would be strengthened.

Key words: standard cost, ratchet effects, comparative performance, dynamic incentives