农户信誉特征、还款意愿传递与农户信贷可得——基于信号传递博弈的理论分析和实证检验

›› 2019, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 77-88.

农户信誉特征、还款意愿传递与农户信贷可得——基于信号传递博弈的理论分析和实证检验

王性玉¹, 任乐¹, 赵辉², 姚唯一³

1. 河南大学商学院, 开封 475004;
2. 河南大学数学与统计学院, 开封 475004;
3. 中国民生银行许昌分行, 许昌 461000

收稿日期:2018-06-28 出版日期:2019-05-28 发布日期:2019-05-31
通讯作者: 任乐(通讯作者),河南大学商学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士。
作者简介:王性玉,河南大学商学院教授,博士生导师,博士;赵辉,河南大学数学与统计学院讲师,博士研究生;姚唯一,中国民生银行许昌分行,硕士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目（71373068）；河南省科技厅软科学研究项目（182400410018）；河南省政府决策招标课题（2018B284）；河南省教育厅人文社科研究项目（2019-ZDJH-268）。

Reputation, Repayment Willingness and Farmer Households' Credit Availability: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test Based on Signaling Game

Wang Xingyu¹, Ren Le¹, Zhao Hui², Yao Weiyi³

1. School of Business, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004;
2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Henan University, Kaifeng 475004;
3. China Minsheng Bank Xuchang Branch, Xuchang 461000

Received:2018-06-28 Online:2019-05-28 Published:2019-05-31

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文通过建立信号传递博弈模型，分析信誉作为农户还款意愿的抵押品替代与农户信贷可得之间的内在作用机理，并根据信号传递博弈的均衡分析结论提出研究假设，进一步以农户获得各类荣誉称号、表彰以及他人评价情况作为农户信誉的替代变量，利用河南农户的调查数据进行实证检验。通过Logit回归模型和Tobit回归模型分析发现，农户具有高信誉特征能够有效增加其信贷可得性和信贷额度，表明农户信誉可以作为一种抵押品替代缓解农户所受信贷配给。此外，农户是否获得信用评级、家庭总收入也显著影响农户信贷可得性和信贷额度。研究结论对完善农村金融市场体系，推进金融扶贫工作，振兴乡村经济具有重要的理论价值和现实指导意义。

关键词: 信誉, 还款意愿, 信号传递博弈, 信贷可得性, 信贷额度

Abstract:

Based on the reputation related literature review, this paper builds the signaling game model to analyze the inherentrelation between farmer households' reputation as collateral substitution and credit availability, and puts forward the corresponding hypotheses. Using the survey data of farmer households in Henan, this paper tests the hypotheses with proxy of reputation measured by farmer households' reputation title and reputation evaluation. Through the Logit and Tobit regression analysis, it finds that high reputation as collateral substitution signal can effectively alleviate the credit constraints of farmer households, increase farmer households' credit availability and credit lines. In addition, credit rating and total income also have a significant effect on them. The results have important theoretical and practical significance for improving the rural financial market system, advancing rural financial poverty alleviation work, and revitalizing the rural economy.

Key words: reputation, repayment willingness, signaling game, credit availability, credit line

王性玉, 任乐, 赵辉, 姚唯一. 农户信誉特征、还款意愿传递与农户信贷可得——基于信号传递博弈的理论分析和实证检验[J]. , 2019, 31(5): 77-88.

Wang Xingyu, Ren Le, Zhao Hui, Yao Weiyi. Reputation, Repayment Willingness and Farmer Households' Credit Availability: Theoretical Analysis and Empirical Test Based on Signaling Game[J]. , 2019, 31(5): 77-88.

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