更换成本与信号传递:证监会行政处罚视角的检验

›› 2018, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 199-208,267.

更换成本与信号传递:证监会行政处罚视角的检验

李晓慧, 孙龙渊

中央财经大学会计学院, 北京 100081

收稿日期:2018-02-23 出版日期:2018-09-28 发布日期:2018-09-29
通讯作者: 孙龙渊(通讯作者),中央财经大学会计学院博士研究生。
作者简介:李晓慧,中央财经大学会计学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目（71672207）；教育部人文科研青年基金（16YJC630185）；全国会计科研课题（重点项目）（2015KJA024）；中央财经大学博士生重点选题计划（2015-PYXT03）。

Switching Cost and Signaling Effect: A Test Based on CSRC Punishment

Li Xiaohui, Sun Longyuan

School of Accounting, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081

Received:2018-02-23 Online:2018-09-28 Published:2018-09-29

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文以1999-2016年受证监会处罚的27家事务所为研究对象，以事务所受处罚后客户的变更情况为切入点，研究发现行政处罚会导致对财务报表审计质量要求较高的客户在事务所受罚后转所，但更看重审计折价和与所内审计师长期合作关系的客户则会选择留下。这说明行政处罚的"信号传递"效应受到更换成本的调节，密切的"审计师-客户"关系和审计成本折价增加更换成本，调节"信号传递"效应，减缓客户流失，但这种调节作用并不能改变一个事实：选择转所的客户财务报表质量较高。

关键词: 审计师-客户关系, 更换成本, 信号传递效应, 证监会行政处罚

Abstract:

We use 27 firms punished by CSRC from 1999 to 2016 to study the customer alteration after CSRC punishment and find customers owning high-quality finance statements will leave the original firms while those who focus on audit discount and intimate relation-ship with auditors cooperated for a long time will choose to stay. The results show high switching cost will adjust signaling effect while lower audit fees and long-period cooperation between auditors and customers will increase the switching cost and decrease signaling effect. This will retard the customer loss. However this kind of adjustment cannot change the fact that customers whose financial statement quality is high will still choose to leave.

Key words: firm-client relationship, switching cost, signaling effect, CSRC punishment

李晓慧, 孙龙渊. 更换成本与信号传递:证监会行政处罚视角的检验[J]. , 2018, 30(9): 199-208,267.

Li Xiaohui, Sun Longyuan. Switching Cost and Signaling Effect: A Test Based on CSRC Punishment[J]. , 2018, 30(9): 199-208,267.

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