›› 2018, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 143-151.

• 市场营销 • 上一篇    下一篇

市场需求和成本信息不对称对制造商开通直销渠道的影响

慕艳芬1, 聂佳佳2, 石纯来2   

  1. 1. 河南理工大学财经学院, 焦作 454000;
    2. 西南交通大学经济管理学院, 成都 610031
  • 收稿日期:2016-05-10 出版日期:2018-09-28 发布日期:2018-09-29
  • 作者简介:慕艳芬,河南理工大学财经学院讲师,硕士生导师,博士;聂佳佳,西南交通大学经济管理学院副教授,博士生导师,博士;石纯来,西南交通大学经济管理学院博士研究生。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目(71672153);河南省教育厅人文社科项目(2017-ZZJH-187)。

Effects of Asymmetric Information about the Demand and the Cost on the Manufacturer's Direct Sale Channel Strategy

Mu Yanfen1, Nie Jiajia2, Shi Chunlai2   

  1. 1. School of Finance and Economics, Henan Polytechnic University, Jiaozuo 454000;
    2. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031
  • Received:2016-05-10 Online:2018-09-28 Published:2018-09-29

摘要:

研究了零售商的市场需求信息和制造商开通直销渠道的固定成本信息对称情形下,制造商不同销售渠道策略选择对零售商销售量和利润带来的影响,以及信息不对称情形下零售商的市场需求信息披露对制造商开通直销渠道的影响。研究发现:对称信息情形下,当开通直销渠道的固定成本较低时,制造商开通直销渠道侵蚀了零售商的部分利润,引起零售商利润下降;当开通直销渠道的固定成本较高时,制造商不开通直销渠道。不对称信息情形下,当市场需求较小时,零售商主动披露市场需求信息;当市场需求较大时,零售商不愿意披露市场需求信息;但是无论零售商披露市场需求信息与否,都不会增加制造商开通直销渠道的概率。

关键词: 信息不对称, 信息披露, 销售渠道

Abstract:

This paper studies the impact of the manufacturer's choice of different distribution channel on the sales quality and profit of the retailer when the information about the market demand and the fixed cost of the manufacturer opening the direct sale channel is symmetric, and the impact of the retailer's market demand information disclosing strategy on the manufacturer's direct distribution channel choice when the above mentioned information is asymmetric. It is found that:if the information is symmetric, the manufacturer cannibalizes the retailer's profit partially and causes the retailer's profit decline when the fixed cost of opening the direct sale channel is low. By the contrast, when the fixed cost is high, the manufacturer doesn't open the direct sale channel. If the information is asymmetric, the re-tailer is willing to voluntarily disclose the low demand information and not to disclose the high demand information, but no matter whether the retailer discloses the market demand or not, it does not essentially increase the probability of the manufacturer opening the direct channel.

Key words: asymmetric information, information disclosure, sale channel