国有股权、政治关联与公司绩效——基于中国民营控股上市公司的实证研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

与以往研究将民营企业家参政作为重要的政治关联方式不同，本研究将民营企业中含有的国有股权视为一种重要的政治关联机制。本文以中国民营控股上市公司为样本，对国有股权在民营企业中的政治关联效应及作用机制进行了理论分析与实证检验。研究发现，民营企业中含有的国有股权能够像企业家参政一样，提高公司绩效，其作用机制在于，国有股权依靠其与政府的天然联系，为民营企业起到制度层面的声誉担保作用，能够帮助民营企业发展获取较多的经济资源与发展空间。同时，对于含有国有股权的民营企业，企业家参政对公司经济资源获取，以及绩效提升的影响程度会显著下降。这表明国有股权所带来的政治关联效应是建立在制度层面上，其作用应该超过表面层次上民营企业家参政的政治关联效应。本文的研究为进一步全面理解在中国经济转型时期混合所有制结构对民营企业的影响提供了一个新视角，并开拓了公司政治关联的研究领域。

关键词: 国有股权, 企业家参政, 政治关联, 混合所有制结构

Abstract:

Unlike previous literatures that treat private entrepreneurs' political participation as an important way of political connection, this study introduces another mechanism of political connections, state ownership in private-owned enterprises. We use a dataset of private-controlled listed companies in China, and empirically investigate the political connection effects and mechanisms of state ownership in private-owned enterprises. The results show that state ownership in private-owned enterprises, just like entrepreneurs' political participation, can improve firm's performances. This is because state ownership relies on its links with the government and helps private-owned enterprises to obtain a number of economic resources. We also find that political participation of entrepreneurs will become less valuable in obtaining economic resources and improving firms' performances if the private-owned enterprises have state ownership. This indicates that the political connection effect by state ownership is built on the institutional-level, and plays a better role than private entrepreneurs' political participation in personal-level. This study provides a new perspective to understand the influence of mixed structure on private-owned enterprises in China's economic transition period, and extends the research fields of corporate political connection.

Key words: state ownership, political participation of entrepreneurs, political connections, mixed-ownership structure

余汉, 杨中仑, 宋增基. 国有股权、政治关联与公司绩效——基于中国民营控股上市公司的实证研究[J]. , 2017, 29(4): 196-212.

Yu Han, Yang Zhonglun, Song Zengji. State Ownership, Political Connections, and Corporate Performance: A Research Based on Chinese Private-controlled Listed Firms[J]. , 2017, 29(4): 196-212.

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