网络交易市场中第三方标记的有效性研究——基于信号传递理论的一个解释

›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (9): 51-60.

网络交易市场中第三方标记的有效性研究——基于信号传递理论的一个解释

王宇, 魏守华

南京大学经济学院, 南京 210093

收稿日期:2014-08-13 出版日期:2016-09-28 发布日期:2016-10-21
作者简介:王宇,南京大学经济学院副教授,博士;魏守华,南京大学经济学院副教授,博士.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目（71103084；71273128）；教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目（15YJC790112）；中国博士后科学基金面上项目（2014M550275）

A Study on Effectiveness of Third-party Seals in Online Transaction Markets from the Perspective of Signaling Theory

Wang Yu, Wei Shouhua

School of Economics, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093

Received:2014-08-13 Online:2016-09-28 Published:2016-10-21

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文在信号传递模型的理论框架下，从混合均衡的角度对网络交易市场中第三方标记的有效性进行了研究。我们发现：第一，在双边垄断市场中，随着标记成本的提高或消费者对不同类型卖家意愿支付差异的缩小，第三方标记的有效性相应提高，而消费者信心对第三方标记有效性的影响存在着不确定性；第二，在竞争性市场中，第三方标记的有效性与标记成本负相关——成本较低的第三方标记往往具有较高的有效性，而成本较高的第三方标记反而效果较差；第三，随着市场竞争程度的提高，标记成本对第三方标记有效性的影响存在自我强化的趋势——低成本标记的有效性会进一步提高，而高成本标记的有效性会进一步下降。

关键词: 第三方标记, 标记成本, 信号传递, 市场结构

Abstract:

This paper studies the effectiveness of third -party seals in online transaction markets from the perspective of hybrid equilibrium in the framework of signaling theory. Firstly, we find that effects of third-party seals are improved with increased sealing costs or shrinking difference of consumer's willingness-to-pay toward different types of sellers in the case of bilateral monopoly market. However, consumer's confidence has an ambiguous influence on third-party seals. Secondly, the effectiveness of third-party seals are negatively related to sealing costs in competitive markets. Seals with low costs have better effects compared with those with high costs. Thirdly, influences from sealing costs on their effectiveness have a trend of self-enhancing, which means that effects of low-cost seals are further improved while those of high-cost seals are further worsened with increased competition in markets.

Key words: third-party seals, sealing cost, signaling, market structure

王宇, 魏守华. 网络交易市场中第三方标记的有效性研究——基于信号传递理论的一个解释[J]. , 2016, 28(9): 51-60.

Wang Yu, Wei Shouhua. A Study on Effectiveness of Third-party Seals in Online Transaction Markets from the Perspective of Signaling Theory[J]. , 2016, 28(9): 51-60.

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