信念互动与产业竞争的关系研究

›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (7): 31-41.

信念互动与产业竞争的关系研究

乔恒

中央财经大学经济学院, 北京 100081

收稿日期:2015-04-02 出版日期:2016-07-28 发布日期:2016-09-01
作者简介:乔恒,中央财经大学经济学院副教授,博士,博士后
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目（71171053；71473282）；北京高等学校青年英才计划项目（YETP0964）；中央财经大学经济学院立项（211项目和学科基金）。

Strategic Belief Interaction and Industrial Competition

Qiao Heng

School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081

Received:2015-04-02 Online:2016-07-28 Published:2016-09-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在我国当前产业竞争的复杂背景下，产业的信念会受到复杂国际国内关系的影响。本文介绍了信念基本概念，比较方法以及影响信念的基本机制。本文研究了对于产业信念具有强大影响力的企业集团策略性调整产业竞争信念的博弈模型，得到了通过影响信念可以有效获取超额企业利润的明确结论，对于产业竞争最优策略的制定、竞争性市场中产业利润的分配、行业的规制和产业政策的调整具有重要的价值。特别对于当前我国国际竞争背景下的策略制定和产业规制具有重要价值。

关键词: 非对称信念, 产业竞争, 博弈论, 拍卖理论

Abstract:

In the background of current complex industrial competition in China, the intra- and inter-national complex relations have a strong influence on the beliefs in the industrial competition. This paper introduces the concept of belief, methods to compare beliefs and mechanisms in which beliefs are influenced. The model in this paper analyzes the belief-influential firm who strategically reveals belief to maximize its own expected payoff. It is proved that this belief-influential firm can profit from strategic belief revelation. This model is valuable for the best strategy formation in the industrial competition, industrial regulatory policy making, and adjustment of the industrial policy in the context of current complex economic competition. Specifically this model has important economic implication for the competition in the complex international environment.

Key words: asymmetric beliefs, industrial competition, game theory, auctions

乔恒. 信念互动与产业竞争的关系研究[J]. , 2016, 28(7): 31-41.

Qiao Heng. Strategic Belief Interaction and Industrial Competition[J]. , 2016, 28(7): 31-41.

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