基于信号理论视角下的企业家政治联系与企业市场绩效的关系研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

以往的文献中企业家政治联系与企业绩效关系的研究结论充满了分歧,并且把市场绩效与财务绩效视作等同的。本文的主张是企业家政治联系传递出有利的信号从而影响企业市场绩效。通过中国民营上市公司2003-2011年的经验数据分析发现,企业家拥有政治联系的企业市场绩效比企业家没有政治联系的企业市场绩效更好;但是细分政治联系类型之后,则没有发现类似结论。对企业家多重政治联系的分析则发现,拥有政治联系的企业家所掌管的企业市场绩效之所以更好,是因为企业家所拥有两种及两种以上政治联系而不是拥有单一政治联系的缘故。本文的贡献在于弥补了以往有关企业家政治联系的研究中笼统的把市场绩效与财务绩效混在一起的不足;同时也弥补了以往研究只考虑单一政治联系而没有考虑多重政治联系的缺憾。

关键词: 企业家政治联系, 市场绩效, 信号理论

Abstract:

The results of past researches on the relationship between entrepreneurial political connections and firm's market performance are ambiguous. They regard the nature of financial performance and market performance as the same. The argument of this paper is that entrepreneurial political connections communicate beneficial signals which impact firm's market performance. Using the data set of Chinese listed private firms from 2003 to 2011, the results show that the market performance of the firms whose entrepreneurs own political connections are better than those whose entrepreneurs do not own political connections. After categorizing the political connections, there are not similar results. Through analysis of the multiple political connections, this study demonstrates that the market performance of the firms whose entrepreneurs own political connections are better because their entrepreneurs own no single but two and more kinds of political connections. This paper corrects the imperfections of the past researches which mix the financial performance and market performance, and fills the gap that they only investigate the single rather than multiple political connections.

Key words: entrepreneurial political connections, firm's market performance, signal theory

刘林. 基于信号理论视角下的企业家政治联系与企业市场绩效的关系研究[J]. , 2016, 28(3): 93-105.

Liu Lin. The Relationship between Entrepreneurial Political Connections and Firm's Market Performance: The Perspective of Signal Theory[J]. , 2016, 28(3): 93-105.

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