多个大股东是否具有合谋动机?——基于家族企业非效率投资视角

›› 2015, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (11): 107-117,191.

• 组织行为与人力资源管理 • 上一篇下一篇

多个大股东是否具有合谋动机?——基于家族企业非效率投资视角

吕怀立¹, 李婉丽^2,3

1. 上海大学管理学院, 上海 200444;
2. 西安交通大学管理学院, 西安 710049;
3. 上海对外经贸大学会计学院, 上海 201620

收稿日期:2013-11-07 出版日期:2015-11-30 发布日期:2015-12-07
作者简介:吕怀立,上海大学管理学院讲师,硕士生导师,博士;李婉丽,西安交通大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,上海对外经贸大学会计学院教授。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71202043;71302195);国家社科基金项目(10BJL014);教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区青年基金项目(14XJC79001);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(FRF-TP-14-054A2)。

Do Multiple Large Shareholders Collude? Empirical Evidence from Chinese Family Firms' Investment Inefficiency

Lyu Huaili¹, Li Wanli^2,3

1. School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444;
2. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049;
3. Accounting School, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai 201620

Received:2013-11-07 Online:2015-11-30 Published:2015-12-07

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文通过构建有效的股东合谋指数,考察了家族上市公司多个大股东存在的合谋动机,并进一步选取2003年至2012年的经验数据,实证检验了股东合谋对家族企业非效率投资现象的影响。实证研究发现股东合谋能够导致家族上市公司的过度投资和投资不足等非效率投资现象;而且,与投资不足相比,股东合谋更容易引起家族上市公司的过度投资。与以往文献仅关注管理层或控股股东的代理问题不同,本文将"股东与股东"的代理问题纳入到统一的分析框架,考察大股东的所有权安排及其配置"关系"对企业投资效率的影响,从而为解释中国家族上市公司的非效率投资现象提供了新的理论视角--股东合谋。

关键词: 股东合谋, 非效率投资, 股东关系, 股权制衡

Abstract:

This paper investigates the collusion of multiple large shareholders in Chinese family firms. We study the influence of shareholders' collusion on investment efficiency using the data from 2003 to 2012 of Chinese family firms. This paper finds that shareholders' collusion can lead to firm's investment inefficiency, such as overinvestment and underinvestment. Compared with underinvestment, firms with large shareholders' collusion are more prone to overinvestment. Unlike prior literature that focuses merely on the agency problems of management or controlling shareholders, this study provides evidence of the agency problem of multiple large shareholders. By examining the effect of the relation and allocation of shareholders ownership, we provide shareholders' collusion, a new theoretical perspective, to explain the investment inefficiency in Chinese family firms.

Key words: shareholders' collusion, investment inefficiency, shareholders' relationship, shareholders' balancing

吕怀立, 李婉丽. 多个大股东是否具有合谋动机?——基于家族企业非效率投资视角[J]. , 2015, 27(11): 107-117,191.

Lyu Huaili, Li Wanli. Do Multiple Large Shareholders Collude? Empirical Evidence from Chinese Family Firms' Investment Inefficiency[J]. , 2015, 27(11): 107-117,191.

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多个大股东是否具有合谋动机?——基于家族企业非效率投资视角

Do Multiple Large Shareholders Collude? Empirical Evidence from Chinese Family Firms' Investment Inefficiency

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