经济补偿与部署警力:环境污染群体性事件应急处置的优化模型

›› 2016, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (8): 51-58.

经济补偿与部署警力:环境污染群体性事件应急处置的优化模型

沈焱¹, 邹华伟², 刘德海², 李仕明¹

1. 电子科技大学经济与管理学院, 成都 611731;
2. 东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院, 大连 116025

收稿日期:2016-06-14 出版日期:2016-08-28 发布日期:2016-09-24
通讯作者: 邹华伟(通讯作者),东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院硕士研究生
作者简介:沈焱,电子科技大学经济与管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士;刘德海,东北财经大学管理科学与工程学院教授,硕士生导师,博士;李仕明,电子科技大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金重大研究计划项目（91224001）;国家自然科学基金面上项目（71271045;7157103）；东北财经大学学科建设支持计划公共安全治理特色学科项目（XKT-201411）。

Economic Compensation or Police Deployment: Optimization Model of Emergency

Shen Yan¹, Zou Huawei², Liu Dehai², Li Shiming¹

1. School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731;
2. School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025

Received:2016-06-14 Online:2016-08-28 Published:2016-09-24

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

环境污染群体性事件对我国创新社会治理、保障国家安全战略提出严峻挑战。根据地方政府提供经济补偿和部署警力两种处置策略，构建了应急处置的优化模型，比较了经济补偿、部署警力妥善处置和处置不当事态恶化的三种情境，分别给出了最优的理论解。最后，结合数值分析方法进一步阐述了理论结论。研究结果表明：经济补偿策略具有事态恶化风险较小的优点，但是容易造成负面的声誉效应。地方政府不依法治理、单纯提供经济补偿的解决思路，从长期上看不利于长治久安。部署警力策略具有经济成本较小的优点，但是处置不当将诱发更大的社会稳定风险。地方政府需要根据具体情境权衡两种应急处置策略。

关键词: 环境污染群体性事件, 优化模型, 经济补偿, 部署警力, 应急管理

Abstract:

Environmental pollution mass event challenges Chinese strategies of innovational social governance and safeguard security. According to the two emergency management strategies of economic compensation and police deployment, the paper builds an optimization model of emergency management, and compares three scenarios that are economic compensation, police proper deployment and police improper deployment. The paper provides the optimization solutions for each case separately. Lastly, the paper discusses in detail the problem by numerical analysis. The results show that the advantage of economic compensation is low risk, but it can cause the serious reputation effect. The solution based only on economic compensation without resorting to governance by law goes against the long-term social stability. The advantage of police deployment is low economic cost, but it should face the larger social unstable risk. Thus, local governments need to balance the two emergency strategies according to the specific scenario.

Key words: environmental pollution mass event, optimization model, economic compensation, police deployment, emergency management

沈焱, 邹华伟, 刘德海, 李仕明. 经济补偿与部署警力:环境污染群体性事件应急处置的优化模型[J]. , 2016, 28(8): 51-58.

Shen Yan, Zou Huawei, Liu Dehai, Li Shiming. Economic Compensation or Police Deployment: Optimization Model of Emergency[J]. , 2016, 28(8): 51-58.

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