关键词: 专精特新企业, 数字化生态系统, 微分博弈, 竞合关系

Abstract: SRDI (Specialized, Refined, Differential, Innovation) enterprises can alleviate resource constraints in digital transformation by leveraging the capabilities of leading enterprises. However, as participants in the ecosystem, they face the challenge of managing coopetition relationships with these leading firms. Given the dynamic and persistent nature of digital resource investment, this paper establishes differential game models for a digital ecosystem with leading enterprises, SRDI enterprises, and local governments as core participants, considering three scenarios: competition-dominated, cooperation-dominated, and one with incentive mechanism. From a “part-whole” perspective, this paper analyzes the optimal strategies of local agents and system benefits under different situations. Furthermore, a simulation analysis is conducted based on a case study of LCFC’s digital empowerment on SRDI enterprises. The findings indicate: (1) The incentive mechanism has significantly improved the enthusiasm of SRDI and leading enterprises for resource investment, and the government’s optimal subsidy level is correlated with the profit distribution coefficient. (2) System benefits are considerably influenced by the initial reputation of the leading enterprise. When initial reputation is high, benefits decline over time in competition-dominated relationships but increase in other scenarios. (3) There is a threshold in the initial digital stock of the system. If this threshold is exceeded, the digital level decreases over time; otherwise, it increases. (4) The technology spillover effects between SRDI enterprises and leading enterprises promote resource investment by both parties across different coopetitive scenarios.

Key words: SRDI enterprises, digital ecosystem, differential game, coopetition