管理评论 ›› 2026, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (2): 94-107.

• 创新与创业管理 • 上一篇    

考虑产业共性技术产品市场的跨组织合作政府研发补贴合同

郑月龙1, 王靖2, 柏群1   

  1. 1. 重庆工商大学工商管理学院, 重庆 400067;
    2. 重庆工商大学成渝地区双城经济圈建设研究院, 重庆 400067
  • 收稿日期:2023-07-18 发布日期:2026-03-13
  • 作者简介:郑月龙(通讯作者),重庆工商大学工商管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;王靖,重庆工商大学成渝地区双城经济圈建设研究院博士研究生;柏群,重庆工商大学工商管理学院教授。
  • 基金资助:
    重庆市哲学社会科学创新工程研究重大项目(2025CXZD03);国家社会科学基金项目(20BJY005);重庆市自然科学基金面上项目(CSTB2024NSCQ-MSX0346);重庆市社会科学规划重点项目(2024NDZD06);2024年重庆市教育委员会人文社会科学研究重点项目(24SKGH130)。

Cross-organizational Collaborative R&D Subsidy Contracts Considering the Product Market for General Purpose Technology

Zheng Yuelong1, Wang Jing2, Bai Qun1   

  1. 1. School of Business Administration, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067;
    2. Institute for Chengdu-Chongqing Economic Zone Development, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067
  • Received:2023-07-18 Published:2026-03-13

摘要: 以两龙头企业参与的共性技术跨组织合作政府研发补贴合同为研究对象,围绕数量-数量(QQ)、价格-价格(PP)、数量-价格(QP)和价格-数量(PQ)4种市场策略组合,考虑产品互补性和替代性,设计了共性技术跨组织合作政府研发补贴合同,解析了政府在何种情形下与龙头企业签订研发补贴合同更能激发企业研发努力水平,并揭示了补贴合同的关键影响因素。研究结果表明:QP、PQ策略组合均不是补贴合同的占优选择;当两企业生产互补产品时,PP策略组合为补贴合同占优选择;当两企业生产替代产品时,若市场规模较小、产品替代程度较高和单位销售成本差距较大,PP策略组合为补贴合同占优选择,反之,QQ策略组合为占优选择。占优策略组合下企业研发努力水平、政府非研发补贴努力水平、企业期望利润和社会福利水平均高于其他策略组合,且受到企业努力水平对研发成功率的影响系数、博弈参与各方努力成本系数等因素的交互影响。两企业产品互补性越小或者替代性越大、市场规模越小,政府应给予成本劣势企业越高比例的补贴。研究结论为促进共性技术跨组织合作研发提供了理论依据和政策启示。

关键词: 产业共性技术, 产品市场, 跨组织合作研发, 政府补贴合同

Abstract: The government R&D subsidy contract for cross-organizational cooperation in general purpose technology involving two leading enterprises is studied, and the government R&D subsidy contract for cross-organizational cooperation in general purpose technology is designed by considering the enterprises product market strategies combination of quantity-quantity (QQ), price-price (PP), quantity-price (QP) and price-quantity (PQ), as well as the complementary and substitution of products. The government R&D subsidy contract for cross-organization cooperation of general purpose technology is designed to analyze under which situation a cross-organization cooperation R&D subsidy contract for general purpose technology between the government and the leading enterprises can better stimulate their R&D efforts and what key factors influence subsidy contracts. The results show that the combination of QP and PQ strategies is not preferred in subsidy contracts. When the two enterprises produce complementary products, the PP strategy combination is preferred in subsidy contracts. When one enterprise produces products that can substitute the other enterprise’s products, both enterprises operate in a small market, their products are highly substitutable and their unit sales costs are very different, the PP strategy combination is preferred in subsidy contracts, and under the opposite situation, the QQ strategy combination is preferred. The R&D effort level, government non-R&D subsidy effort, expected profit of the two enterprises and social welfare level under the preferred strategy combination are higher than those of other strategy combinations, and are affected by the coefficient of their effort’s influence on the R&D success rate and the cost coefficient of the efforts of all parties involved in the game. When the two enterprises’ products are less complementary or more substitutable with each other, and they operate in a small market, the higher the proportion of subsidies that the government should give more subsidies to the enterprise at cost disadvantage. The research conclusions provide theoretical and policy implications for promoting general purpose technology cross-organizational cooperative R&D.

Key words: general purpose technology, product market, cross-organizational cooperative R&D, government subsidy contracts