政治周期、要素流动与区际公共服务策略互动——应用准实验设计的空间因果机制识别

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 空间计量分析作为检验空间依赖关系存在性的常用实证方法，其内生性问题处理与因果效应识别策略较少得到关注，造成了强空间相关弱空间因果的经验识别陷阱和计量模型分析与内在驱动机制匹配失效的理论阐释不足。本文聚焦于中国区际公共服务的空间依赖特征的研究情境，利用省级官员更替对地区公共服务发展的周期性影响以及公共服务领域要素市场改革的政策效应模拟准实验情境，通过空间工具变量分离出特定地区公共服务受到其空间邻近地区影响的净效应，并基于动态空间自回归模型的系统GMM估计进行因果机制识别。研究发现，地区间公共服务存在正向空间关联关系，且受到官员政治周期下的政府间竞争、资本与人口要素跨地区流动等因素的外生驱动，证明了基于标尺竞争机制和资源流动机制的区际策略互动的因果效应。本文将准实验设计纳入空间计量分析进行因果机制识别，为后续研究提供了方法借鉴；研究结论也细化了“区域间融合互动、融通补充”这一公共服务区域协调发展战略的政策内涵。

关键词: 公共服务, 空间策略互动, 空间计量, 准实验设计

Abstract: Spatial econometric analysis, while widely used to examine spatial dependence, suffers from understudied endogeneity issues and causal identification strategies, leading to empirical pitfalls (e.g., overstating correlation over causation) and theoretical limitations (e.g., mismatches between econometric models and mechanisms). This study examines China’s interregional public services by leveraging quasi-experimental scenarios, where provincial official turnover and factor market reforms play their respective roles, to isolate spatial spillovers via spatial IVs and system GMM estimation. Results reveal positive spatial interdependence, driven by intergovernmental competition (tied to political cycles) and factor mobility (capital/population flows), confirming causal mechanisms (yardstick competition and resource flow). By integrating quasi-experimental designs into spatial econometrics, this study advances causal inference methods and refines policy insights for regionally coordinated public service development, emphasizing cross-regional interaction and complementarity.

Key words: public services, spatial strategic interaction, spatial econometrics, quasi-experimental design

苑贺辉, 宋金波, 聂榕. 政治周期、要素流动与区际公共服务策略互动——应用准实验设计的空间因果机制识别[J]. 管理评论, 2026, 38(2): 15-30.

Yuan Hehui, Song Jinbo, Nie Rong. Political Cycle, Factor Flow, and Strategic Interaction of Public Services among Regions: Identification of Spatial Causality Using Quasi-experimental Settings[J]. Management Review, 2026, 38(2): 15-30.

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