中国反垄断执法的惩戒效应：来自股票市场的证据

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于手工收集的上市公司受到反垄断执法的数据库，本文采用事件研究法，考察了股票市场对反垄断执法的反应，为中国反垄断执法的惩戒效应提供了初步证据。具体地，本文发现，在反垄断立案调查和处罚决定事件附近，市场均产生显著的负反应，被执法企业的市值损失达到11.5%。在一些垄断违法的典型行业，市场负反应还会溢出到整个行业，说明反垄断执法不仅惩罚了违法企业，还能有力地威慑整个垄断行业。进一步分析市场反应的异质性表明，市场反应的大小除了能被直接违法成本、垄断利润调整成本和市场信号机制解释外，在中国独特的反垄断执法制度背景下，违法企业的央企性质、执法机构类型、违法信息公开及时程度，同样会影响市场反应大小。本文的结论对评价中国反垄断执法成效、指导反垄断立法和执法机构改革均具有重要意义。

关键词: 反垄断执法, 惩戒效应, 事件研究法, 市场反应

Abstract: Based on hand collected listed-company antitrust enforcement database, this paper uses event study to investigate response of stock market on antitrust enforcement, and provides primary evidence for the disciplinary effects of Chinese antitrust enforcement. Specifically, this paper finds that the market reacts negatively toward a company that will receive or already received antitrust investigation or final penalty, and the company will suffer a 11.5% loss of market value. In typical infringing industries, negative reaction will spill over to the whole industry, indicating that antitrust enforcement not only punishes infringing firms, but also effectively deters the whole monopoly industry. Further analysis on the heterogeneity of market reactions reveals that the strength of market recaction can be explained by direct law-breaking cost, readjustment cost of monopoly profit and market signal effect, and under China’s unique institutional background of antitrust enforcement, the strength of market reaction will also be affected by the nature of companie as central CEOs, type of enforcement agent and timeliness in release of infringement information. These results are of great significance for evaluating the achievements of antitrust enforcement in China, as well as for guiding the reform of antitrust legislation and enforcement agencies.

Key words: antitrust enforcement, disciplinary effects, event study method, market reaction

谭诗羽, 凌鸿程, 于舒奕. 中国反垄断执法的惩戒效应：来自股票市场的证据[J]. 管理评论, 2025, 37(12): 54-65.

Tan Shiyu, Ling Hongcheng, Yu Shuyi. Disciplinary Effects of Chinese Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from Stock Market[J]. Management Review, 2025, 37(12): 54-65.

参考文献

[1] 叶卫平. 反垄断法分析模式的中国选择[J]. 中国社会科学, 2017,(3):96-115 Ye W. P. A Chinese Option for an Analytical Model for Anti-monopoly Law[J]. Social Sciences in China, 2017,(3):96-115
[2] 王健,方翔. 中国反垄断罚款裁量的不确定性及其克服[J]. 社会科学战线, 2021,(5):202-214 Wang J., Fang X. An Empirical Research on the Uncertainty of China's Anti-monopoly Fine Discretion and Its Countermeasures[J]. Social Science Front, 2021,(5):202-214
[3] 王彦超,蒋亚含. 竞争政策与企业投资——基于《反垄断法》实施的准自然实验[J]. 经济研究, 2020,55(8):137-152 Wang Y. C., Jiang Y. H. Competition Policy and Corporate Investment:Quasi-natural Experiments Based on the Implementation of the Anti-monopoly Law[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2020,55(8):137-152
[4] 肖土盛,董启琛,张明昂,等. 竞争政策与企业劳动收入份额——基于《反垄断法》实施的准自然实验[J]. 中国工业经济, 2023,(4):117-135 Xiao T. S., Dong Q. C., Zhang M. A., et al. Competition Policy and Enterprises Labor Income Share-Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the China's Anti-monopoly Law[J]. China Industrial Economics, 2023,(4):117-135
[5] 丁茂中. 我国《反垄断法》的修订路径[J]. 法学, 2020,(5):133-150 Ding M. Z. Amendment Approach of Anti-monopoly Act in China[J]. Law Science, 2020,(5):133-150
[6] Combe E., Monnier C., Legal R. Cartels:The Probability of Getting Caught in the European Union[Z]. Bruges European Economic Research Papers 12, 2008
[7] Combe E., Monnier C. Fines Against Hard Core Cartels in Europe:The Myth of Overenforcement[J]. The Antitrust Bulletin, 2011,56(2):235-275
[8] Carree M., Günster A., Schinkel M. P. European Antitrust Policy 1957-2004:An Analysis of Commission Decisions[J]. Review of Industrial Organization, 2010,36(2):97-131
[9] 王健. 我国反垄断罚款威慑不足的制度成因及破解思路[J]. 法学评论, 2020,38(4):109-118 Wang J. Institutional Causes of Antitrust Fines' Under-deterrence in China and Solutions Thereto[J]. Law Review, 2020,38(4):109-118
[10] 阿尔贝托·海姆勒. 中国反垄断法实施12年回顾:基于比较视角的评估[M]//李青主编. 中国反垄断十二年——回顾与展望. 北京:中信出版集团, 2020 Heimler A. A 12-Year Review of China's Anti-monopoly Law:An Assessment Based on a Comparative Perspective[M]//Li Q. Twelve Years of Anti-monopoly in China:Review and Prospects. Beijing:CITIC Press Group, 2020
[11] 于立,杨童,冯博. 《反垄断法》对国有企业的适用性及疑难问题——E-B-C范式的构建与应用[J]. 财经问题研究, 2021,(4):11-27 Yu L., Yang T., Feng B. The Suitability and Puzzles in Enforcing 'the Antitrust Law' on State-owned Enterprises:The Design and Application of E-B-C Paradigm[J]. Research on Financial and Economic Issues, 2021,(4):11-27
[12] Detre J. D., Golub A. A. A Reexamination of the Profitability of Price Fixing Using Stock Price Movement:Has New Antitrust Legislation Been a More Effective Deterrent of Price Fixing? Staff Papers[Z]. Purdue University, 2004
[13] Günster A., van Dijk M. The Impact of European Antitrust Policy:Evidence from the Stock Market[J]. International Review of Law and Economics, 2016,46:20-33
[14] 王琳,李欢,高伊琳,等. 信息披露质量对企业声誉的影响及作用机制——基于上海电气财务爆雷事件的案例分析[J]. 管理评论, 2022,34(8):341-352 Wang L., Li H., Gao Y. L., et al. The Impact of Information Disclosure Quality on Corporate Reputation:A Case Study Based on Shanghai Electric's Financial Reporting Fraud[J]. Management Review, 2022,34(8):341-352
[15] Zhang A. H. Strategic Public Shaming:Evidence from Chinese Antitrust Investigations[J]. The China Quarterly, 2019,237:174-195
[16] 潘宁. 反垄断罚款裁量权控制[J]. 财经法学, 2021,(3):111-126 Pan N. Control on the Discretion of Antitrust Penalties[J]. Law and Economy, 2021,(3):111-126
[17] 李凯,李相辰. 谈判势力视角下平台独占交易行为效应研究——兼论中国B2 C市场的"二选一"与反垄断规制[J]. 管理评论, 2021,33(11):238-248 Li K., Li X. C. Research on the Effect of Platform Exclusive Transaction Behavior from the Perspective of Negotiation Power-A Discussion about Chinese B2 C Market's "One-out-of-Two" Arrangement and Anti-monopoly Regulations[J]. Management Review, 2021,33(11):238-248
[18] 陈庭强,沈嘉贤,杨青浩,等. 平台经济反垄断的双边市场治理路径——基于阿里垄断事件的案例研究[J]. 管理评论, 2022,34(3):338-352 Chen T. Q., Shen J. X., Yang Q. H., et al. The Bilateral Market Governance Path of Platform Economy Anti-monopoly:Based on the Case Study of Alibaba Monopoly Event[J]. Management Review, 2022,34(3):338-352
[19] Smuda F. Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of Eu Competition Law[J]. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2014,10(1):63-86
[20] De Loecker J., Eeckhout J., Unger G. The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2020,135(2):561-644
[21] Shapiro C. Antitrust in a Time of Populism[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2018,61:714-748
[22] Baker J. B. The Antitrust Paradigm:Restoring a Competitive Economy[M]. Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 2019
[23] 冯博. 反垄断法中罚款数额的影响因素与实证检验——基于我国反垄断法实施十年的数据[J]. 山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2019,(3):11-23 Feng B. Influencing Factors and Empirical Test of the Penalty Amount in Anti-monopoly Law:Based on the Past Ten Years' Data since the Implementation of China's Anti-monopoly Law[J]. Journal of Shandong University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), 2019,(3):11-23
[24] 冯博. 没收违法所得与罚款在反垄断执法中的组合适用[J]. 法商研究, 2018,35(3):137-147 Feng B. Combination of "Confiscation of Illegal Gains" and "Fines" in the Anti-monopoly Law[J]. Studies in Law and Business, 2018,35(3):137-147
[25] 白让让. 企业间合谋的特征化事实、运作机制和监管困境——以我国"垄断协议"的行政执法实践为例[J]. 中国人民大学学报, 2022,36(4):108-122 Bai R. R. On the Characteristic Facts and Operational Mechanism of Business Collusions and the Difficulties in Supervising Them:Taking the Practice of China's Anti-monopoly Administrative Law Enforcement Agencies as an Example[J]. Journal of Renmin University of China, 2022,36(4):108-122
[26] Stiebale J., Szücs F., Mergers and Market Power:Evidence from Rivals' Responses in European Markets[J]. The RAND Journal of Economics, 2022,53(4):678-702
[27] Bosch J. C., Eckard E. W. The Profitability of Price Fixing:Evidence from Stock Market Reaction to Federal Indictments[J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1991,73(2):309
[28] Aguzzoni L., Langus G., Motta M. The Effect of EU Antitrust Investigations and Fines on a Firm's Valuation[J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2013,61(2):290-338
[29] Bos I., Letterie W., Scherl N. Industry Impact of Cartels:Evidence from the Stock Market[J]. Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 2019,15(2-3):358-379
[30] Mariuzzo F., Ormosi P. L., Majied Z. Fines and Reputational Sanctions:The Case of Cartels[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2020,69:102584
[31] 刘行,陈澈. 消费税征收环节后移对企业的影响——来自股票市场的初步证据[J]. 经济研究, 2021,56(3):100-115 Liu H., Chen C. Effect of the Backward Movement of Excise Tax Collection on Enterprises:Initial Evidence from the Stock Market[J]. Economic Research Journal, 2021,56(3):100-115
[32] 时建中,焦海涛,戴龙. 反垄断行政执法典型案件分析与解读(2008-2018)[M]. 北京:中国政法大学出版社, 2018 Shi J. Z., Jiao H. T., Dai L. Analysis and Interpretation of Typical Cases of Antimonopoly Administrative Enforcement(2008-2018)[M]. Beijing:China University of Political Science and Law Press, 2018
[33] Fama E. F., French K. R. Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1993,33(1):3-56
[34] Carhart M. M. On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance[J]. The Journal of Finance, 1997,52(1):57-82
[35] Fama E. F., French K. R. A Five-factor Asset Pricing Model[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2015,116(1):1-22
[36] 丁浩员,樊海潮,王丹,等. 外部冲击对中国资本市场的影响研究:基于企业出口的视角[J]. 财贸经济, 2022,43(11):108-123 Ding H. Y., Fan H. C., Wang D., et al. On the Transmission Mechanism of the Impact of Public Emergencies on China's Capital Market:Evidence from Export Enterprises[J]. Finance & Trade Economics, 2022,43(11):108-123
[37] Zhang A. H. Chinese Antitrust Exceptionalism:How the Rise of China Challenges Global Regulation[M]. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2021
[38] Dombrow J., Rodriguez M., Sirmans C. F. A Complete Nonparametric Event Study Approach[J]. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 2000,14(4):361-380