管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (7): 3-14.

• 经济与金融管理 •    下一篇

金融创新、市场风险与监管策略的动态分析——基于三方演化博弈模型

宫庆彬, 刁训娣, 吴冲锋   

  1. 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院, 上海 200030
  • 收稿日期:2022-08-09 发布日期:2025-07-30
  • 作者简介:宫庆彬(通讯作者),上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院副研究员,硕士生导师,博士;刁训娣,上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院副教授,博士生导师,博士;吴冲锋,上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71790592;72342023);国家社会科学基金项目(22BJY175;23AJY024)。

Dynamic Analysis of Financial Innovation, Risks and Supervision Based on Tripartite Evolutionary Game

Gong Qingbin, Diao Xundi, Wu Chongfeng   

  1. Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030
  • Received:2022-08-09 Published:2025-07-30

摘要: 基于金融机构、投资者和监管者的策略互动和行为假设,本文构建了金融创新产品市场的三方演化博弈模型。考虑了投资者参与度与市场风险水平的关联及其对参与者行为的影响,建立了博弈的时变收益矩阵。借助动力系统分析方法,求解了模型的均衡点及其稳定性条件。研究表明,混合策略不是演化稳定策略。金融创新产品的风险水平、创新成本、监管成本、监管效率、投资成本等因素会影响市场均衡和市场演化路径。为了实现较低风险的监管目标,监管者需要采取措施降低监管成本、提高监管效率、增加高风险金融产品的成本等。数值仿真结果进一步展示了不同参数条件下市场演化的复杂性,以及监管政策调整对市场演化的影响。当市场存在多重均衡时,监管者需要从改变市场初始条件和均衡稳定性条件出发,同时采取多种监管措施。本文的研究结果丰富了金融创新和监管的相关理论研究,对制定和调整监管策略有重要的启发意义。

关键词: 金融创新, 金融监管, 演化博弈, 稳定性

Abstract: Based on the strategic interaction and behavioral assumptions of financial institutions, investors and market regulators, a tripartite evolutionary game model of the financial innovation is constructed. The study establishes a time-varying return matrix for the game by taking account of the correlation between investor participation and market risk levels, as well as their impacts on participant behavior. With the dynamical system method, the equilibria of the model are solved, and the asymptotic stability conditions of equilibria are investigated. The result shows that the mixed strategies are not evolutionary stable strategies (ESS). The evolutionary dynamics are influenced by many factors such as the risk level of financial innovation, the efficiency of supervision, the innovation costs, and investment costs. In order to achieve the low-risk regulatory goals, regulators need to take measures to reduce regulatory costs, improve regulatory efficiency, and increase input costs of high-risk financial products. The numerical simulations further demonstrate the complexity of market dynamics under different parameter conditions, as well as the impact of regulatory policy on market evolution. When there are multiple equilibria, regulators should take several measures simultaneously by changing the initial market conditions and equilibrium stability conditions. This study enriches the theoretical research on financial innovation and regulation, and provides significant implications for formulating and adjusting regulatory strategies.

Key words: financial innovation, supervision, evolutionary game, stability