独立董事捆绑聘任与盈余管理：“刚正不阿”还是“安分守己”

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 独立董事履职的声誉机制理论认为，独董会为了维持其声誉勤勉履职。捆绑聘任的独董既可能维持“刚正不阿”的声誉，从而发挥更强的治理作用；也可能追求“安分守己”的声誉，以维系关系，两类动机下独董会做出相应的履职行为。本文以2004—2019年我国A股上市公司为样本，实证检验独董捆绑聘任对盈余管理的影响。研究发现，独董捆绑聘任关系的强度越大，企业的应计盈余管理程度越低，而真实活动盈余管理程度越高。大股东权力较大或公司缺乏机构投资者股东监督时，这一效应更为明显。以上结果表明，捆绑聘任独董很可能采取“安分守己”的履职策略而对企业盈余管理起到“有限监督”效果。研究还发现，在非国有企业、未购买董责险的企业中，捆绑聘任独董对应计盈余管理（真实活动盈余管理）的抑制（提升）作用更强；独董捆绑聘任现象存在较强的时序依赖特征；捆绑聘任独董更可能缺席董事会会议，但相对普通独董不具有显著的反对投票行为差异。本文对声誉机制理论进行了有益补充，丰富了独董个人特征对履职效果影响的研究，并基于此为优化独董轮换制度提供政策建议。

关键词: 独立董事, 捆绑聘任, 盈余管理, 声誉机制

Abstract: According to the reputation mechanism theory of independent directors’ performance of duties, independent directors perform their duties diligently in order to maintain their reputation. Independent directors who take office as part of a transfer bundle may play a stronger governance role if they want to maintain the reputation of ‘integrity’, but they may also come across as ‘staying silent’ if they focus on maintaining relationships. This paper takes Chinese A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2019 as a sample to test the impact of bundled independent directors on earnings management. We find that the greater the strength of the independent director’s bundling relationship, the lower the earnings management based on accruals, and the higher the real activity earnings management, which supports the reputation-supervision mechanism. This effect is more significant when the major shareholder has greater power or the firm lacks institutional investor shareholder supervision. The above results indicate that bundled independent directors are likely to have a limited supervisory effect on corporate earnings management, and the ‘staying silent’ strategy can better explain the behavior of bundled independent directors. Further, in non-state-owned enterprises and firms that do not purchase directors’ liability insurance, bundled independent directors have a stronger inhibitory (enhancing) effect on earnings management based on accruals (real activity earnings management). Besides, bundled independent directors have a strong temporal dependence feature, and is more likely to be absent from board meetings, while there is no significant difference in opposing votes compared to other independent directors. This paper makes a useful supplement to the theory of reputation mechanism, enriches the research on the impact of independent directors’ personal characteristics on the performance of their duties, and provides suggestive policies for optimizing the rotation system of independent directors.

Key words: independent director, bundled appointment, earnings management, reputation mechanism

苏子豪, 彭斐, 吴武清. 独立董事捆绑聘任与盈余管理：“刚正不阿”还是“安分守己”[J]. 管理评论, 2025, 37(3): 190-203.

Su Zihao, Peng Fei, Wu Wuqing. Bundled Independent Directors and Earnings Management: Fighting for Integrity or Staying Silent[J]. Management Review, 2025, 37(3): 190-203.

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