管理评论 ›› 2025, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (3): 136-148.

• 电子商务与信息管理 • 上一篇    

政府数据开放视域下跨区域政府数据共治四方博弈分析

武森1, 杨正凡1, 单志广2, 何慧霞1, 魏桂英1   

  1. 1. 北京科技大学经济管理学院, 北京 100083;
    2. 国家信息中心信息化和产业发展部, 北京 100045
  • 收稿日期:2023-06-26 发布日期:2025-04-02
  • 作者简介:武森,北京科技大学经济管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;杨正凡,北京科技大学经济管理学院博士研究生;单志广(通讯作者),国家信息中心信息化和产业发展部主任,研究员,博士生导师,博士;何慧霞,北京科技大学经济管理学院博士研究生;魏桂英,北京科技大学经济管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家社会科学基金重大项目(22&ZD153)。

Cross-regional Government Data Co-governance under the Perspective of Open Government Data: A Quadrilateral Evolutionary Game Analysis

Wu Sen1, Yang Zhengfan1, Shan Zhiguang2, He Huixia1, Wei Guiying1   

  1. 1. School of Economics & Management, University of Science and Technology Beijing, Beijing 100083;
    2. Department of Informatization and Industry Development, State Information Center, Beijing 100045
  • Received:2023-06-26 Published:2025-04-02

摘要: 我国政府数据开放进程存在区域性差异,跨区域的政府开放数据缺乏流动性和协调性,严重阻碍跨区域开放数据的汇聚及利用,亟须多主体协同数据治理推动跨区域政府数据共治,以进一步挖掘开放数据价值。本文构建了包含中央政府、两个处于同行政级别的跨区域政府数据开放平台和数据利用群体的数据共治四方演化博弈模型,探究多主体参与数据共治的均衡策略及策略稳定性,并结合2022年两地方政府相关数据进行仿真分析,研究政策差异、数据利用群体行为等关键因素对演化路径的影响。研究发现:中央政府对数据利用群体实施补贴机制能够促进其进行信息反馈,进而促进两区域政府开放数据平台的数据共治,且随着共治满意度的提升,中央政府对平台由惩罚机制转向补贴机制;补贴机制下的交互激励机制能够缓解政府数据共治中平台的搭便车行为,实现数据共治;惩罚机制在特定条件下实施差异化激励能避免两区域平台陷入囚徒困境,实现数据共治。最后,从数据共治各参与主体的角度对政府数据共治和政府数据开放提出管理建议,为跨区域政府对开放数据实施数据共治提供参考。

关键词: 政府数据开放, 数据共治, 数据利用群体, 跨区域, 四方演化博弈

Abstract: There are regional differences in the process of government data opening in China, and the lack of mobility and coordination of government open data in different regions seriously hinders the aggregation and utilization of cross-regional heterogeneous data. Therefore, it is necessary for multi-party participants to collaborate in data governance and promote cross-regional government data co-governance in order to further explore the value of open data. This paper constructs a quadrilateral evolutionary game model of data co-governance that includes the central government, two cross-regional government data open platforms at the same administrative level, and data utilization groups to explore the equilibrium strategy and strategy stability of multi-party participation in government data co-governance. It also combines the simulation analysis of data related to two local governments in 2022 to study key factors such as policy differences and data utilization groups’ behavior on the evolutionary path. This paper finds that: the central government’s subsidy mechanism for data utilization groups can promote their information feedback, which in turn promotes data co-governance of open government data platforms in the two regions, and as the satisfaction level of co-governance increases, the central government shifts from the punishment mechanism to the subsidy mechanism for platforms; the cross-incentive mechanism under the subsidy mechanism can alleviate the free-rider behavior of platforms in government data co-governance and realize collaborative data co-governance in the two regions; the implementation of differential incentives under the penalty mechanism under specific conditions can avoid the prisoner’s dilemma of the two regional platforms and realize the collaborative data co-governance. Finally, policy and management suggestions are put forward from the perspective of each government data co-governance participant to provide a reference for cross-regional local governments to implement government data co-governance on open data.

Key words: open government data, data co-governance, data utilization groups, cross-regional, quadrilateral evolutionary game