员工股权激励的实施动机与经济后果研究

›› 2015, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (9): 163-176.

• 组织行为与人力资源管理 • 上一篇下一篇

员工股权激励的实施动机与经济后果研究

陈艳艳

华南农业大学经济管理学院, 广州 510642

收稿日期:2014-03-28 出版日期:2015-09-30 发布日期:2015-09-29
作者简介:陈艳艳,华南农业大学经济管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(71402058);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目(13YJC790013);广东省软科学计划项目(2013B070207007);广东省学科建设专项基金项目(2013WYM_0001)。

Research on the Determinant and Economical Consequence of Employee Stock Option

Chen Yanyan

College of Economics and Management, South China Agriculture University, Guangzhou 510642

Received:2014-03-28 Online:2015-09-30 Published:2015-09-29

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文以2005年7月1日到2012年12月31日期间发布股权激励计划的410个上市公司为样本,研究员工股权激励的实施动机与经济后果。实施动机有三种解释理论,分别是激励员工、吸引和留住员工、融资约束。全样本与民营企业样本的回归结果表明,吸引和留住员工、以及融资约束的解释力较强,而激励员工的解释力较弱。对于国有企业,三种理论不能很好地解释其员工股权激励的实施动机。关于经济后果,理论上的赞同与批评观点同时存在,尚无一致的结论。本文通过市场反应与销售增长率检验员工股权激励的经济后果。市场反应的单因素分析表面,员工股权激励有微弱的负面影响;而其他检验均未发现员工股权激励产生显著的经济后果。

关键词: 员工股权激励, 实施动机, 经济后果

Abstract:

Based on 410 listed firms that announced stock option plans during the period from July 1, 2005 to Dec. 31, 2012, this paper study the determinant and economical consequence of employee stock option(EOS). There are three theories for the determinant, which are to create incentives for employees, to attract and retain employees, and financing constraints. The result of full sample and private-owned enterprises indicates that, the second and the third theory could offer strong explanation while the first theory's explanation is weak. For state-owned enterprises, all of the three theories could not explain it well. For economical consequence, there is no consensus in theory now. The paper examines economical consequence by testing market reaction and sales growth. A simple comparison about market reaction reveals that EOS has weak negative impact. Nevertheless, other tests find no relation between EOS and economical consequence.

Key words: employee stock option, determinant, economical consequence

陈艳艳. 员工股权激励的实施动机与经济后果研究[J]. , 2015, 27(9): 163-176.

Chen Yanyan. Research on the Determinant and Economical Consequence of Employee Stock Option[J]. , 2015, 27(9): 163-176.

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员工股权激励的实施动机与经济后果研究

Research on the Determinant and Economical Consequence of Employee Stock Option

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