精准扶贫中道德风险的形成机理及其在乡村振兴中的规避研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 文章以委托代理理论与机制设计理论为指导,以精准扶贫实践中"中央统筹、省负总责、市县抓落实"的工作机制为研究对象,通过建立中央政府、地方政府、村委会、农户之间的三层委托-代理框架,梳理了精准扶贫过程中各参与主体的激励约束机制和行为选择,分析了精准扶贫实践中精英俘获、贫困人口福利依赖、"数字脱贫"等道德风险问题的形成机理,并从激励相容视角提出了相应的规避措施,以期为进一步巩固脱贫成果、推动乡村振兴提供有益借鉴。

关键词: 精准扶贫, 乡村振兴, 道德风险, 多重委托－代理

Abstract: Guided by the principal-agent theory and mechanism design theory, this paper makes a research into the working mechanism of “overall plan by the central government, responsibility by provincial governments, and implementation by lower-level governments” that underlies the practice of targeted poverty alleviation. By establishing a three-tier principal-agent framework among the central government, local governments, village committee and farmers, this paper sums up the incentive and restraint mechanisms and behavior choices of each participant in the process of targeted poverty alleviation, and analyzes the formation mechanism of moral hazard problems such as elite capture problem, poor people’s welfare dependency, “digital poverty alleviation”. Furthermore, we put forward corresponding countermeasures for consolidating the achievements of poverty alleviation and promoting rural revitalization from the perspective of incentive compatibility.

Key words: targeted poverty alleviation, rural revitalization, moral hazard, multiple principal-agent

张永丽, 任思超, 李青原, 陈建仲. 精准扶贫中道德风险的形成机理及其在乡村振兴中的规避研究[J]. 管理评论, 2024, 36(3): 237-245,257.

Zhang Yongli, Ren Sichao, Li Qingyuan, Chen Jianzhong. Research on the Formation Mechanism of Moral Hazard in Targeted PovertyAlleviation and Its Avoidance in Rural Revitalization[J]. Management Review, 2024, 36(3): 237-245,257.

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