产业政策工具、企业投资效率与股价崩盘风险

管理评论 ›› 2023, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (1): 272-282.

产业政策工具、企业投资效率与股价崩盘风险

吴世农¹, 尤博¹, 王建勇², 陈韫妍¹

1. 厦门大学管理学院, 厦门 361005;
2. 厦门国家会计学院教研中心, 厦门 361005

收稿日期:2021-08-12 出版日期:2023-01-28 发布日期:2023-02-27
通讯作者: 陈韫妍(通讯作者),厦门大学管理学院博士研究生
作者简介:吴世农,厦门大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;尤博,厦门大学管理学院硕士研究生;王建勇,厦门国家会计学院教研中心讲师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金重大项目(71790601)。

Industrial Policy Tools, Enterprise Investment Efficiency and Stock Price Crash Rish

Wu Shinong¹, You Bo¹, Wang Jianyong², Chen Yunyan¹

1. School of Management, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005;
2. The Teaching and Research Center, Xiamen National Accounting Institute, Xiamen 361005

Received:2021-08-12 Online:2023-01-28 Published:2023-02-27

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 中国在推动实施产业政策时通常采用三种政策工具:财政补贴、税收减免和银行优惠信贷支持。本文研究受惠于产业政策的上市公司的投资效率及其股价崩盘风险,以及上述三种政策工具的作用机制。本文以2006—2018年A股上市公司为样本,研究发现:第一,受惠于产业政策支持的企业,其投资效率显著下降。同时,产业政策一方面完全通过增加企业的财政补贴和信贷支持降低企业的投资效率;另一方面则部分通过税收优惠降低企业投资效率。第二,企业投资效率的下降显著地增大其股价崩盘风险,且相对于税收优惠和财政补贴较少的企业,因产业政策支持而获得较多税收优惠和财政补贴的企业,其投资效率对股价崩盘风险的负向影响更显著。第三,相较信贷支持最高组和最低组的企业,信贷支持居中组的企业,投资效率与股价崩盘风险的负向关系最为显著。本文首次从产业政策工具的视角出发,分别揭示了产业政策与投资效率之间的关系、投资效率与股价崩盘之间的关系以及三种产业政策工具在其中的作用,为制定和调整产业政策以及评价和提高产业政策工具的效率提供新的思路。

关键词: 产业政策工具, 投资效率, 股价崩盘风险

Abstract: China usually uses three traditional policy tools when promoting the implementation of industrial policies: financial subsidies, tax relief and bank preferential credit. This paper studies the investment efficiency and stock price collapse risk of listed companies benefiting from industrial policies, as well as the mechanisms of the above three policy tools. Using the 2006-2018 China’ s A-share listed companies as a sample, this paper finds the following results. First, companies supported by industrial policies have seen a significant decrease in investment efficiency. On the one hand, the industrial policy reduces the investment efficiency of enterprises entirely by increasing financial subsidies and new bank loans, on the other hand, it reduces the investment efficiency of enterprises partly through tax incentives. Second, the decline of enterprise investment efficiency significantly increases the risk of stock price collapse. Compared with enterprises with less tax incentives and financial subsidies, enterprises that receive more tax incentives and financial subsidies due to industrial policy support have a more significant positive impact on the risk of stock price collapse. Third, compared with enterprises in the highest and lowest groups of new bank loans, enterprises in the middle group of new bank loans have the most significant positive relationship between investment efficiency and stock price collapse risk. This paper first discusses its impact on industrial policy and investment efficiency of beneficiary enterprises and its impact on stock price collapse from the perspective of industrial policy tools, and reveals the relationship between industrial policy and investment efficiency, the relationship between investment efficiency and stock price collapse, as well as the role of three industrial policy tools. It provides new ideas for formulating and adjusting industrial policies and evaluating and improving the efficiency of industrial policy tools.

Key words: industrial policy, investment efficiency, stock price crash risk

吴世农, 尤博, 王建勇, 陈韫妍. 产业政策工具、企业投资效率与股价崩盘风险[J]. 管理评论, 2023, 35(1): 272-282.

Wu Shinong, You Bo, Wang Jianyong, Chen Yunyan. Industrial Policy Tools, Enterprise Investment Efficiency and Stock Price Crash Rish[J]. Management Review, 2023, 35(1): 272-282.

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