管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2022, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (12): 251-263.

• 会计与财务管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

投行关系、声誉与并购绩效——基于关系契约的视角

余鹏翼1,2, 陈新3, 陈文婷1,2, 余言4   

  1. 1. 广东外语外贸大学会计学院, 广州 510006;
    2. 广东省普通高校人文社科重点研究基地“跨国并购与创新战略研究中心”, 广州 510006;
    3. 暨南大学管理学院, 广州 510006;
    4. Business School, National University of Singapore, Singapore 119245
  • 收稿日期:2020-07-29 出版日期:2022-12-28 发布日期:2023-01-16
  • 通讯作者: 陈新(通讯作者),暨南大学管理学院博士研究生。
  • 作者简介:余鹏翼,广东外语外贸大学会计学院教授,博士生导师,博士;陈文婷,广东外语外贸大学会计学院副教授/跨国并购与创新战略研究中心兼职研究员,硕士生导师,博士;余言,Business School,National University of Singapore, Master Candidate。
  • 基金资助:
    广州市哲学社会科学规划2020年度课题(2020GZYB44)。

Investment Bank Relationship, Reputation and M&A Performance——Based on Relational Contract

Yu Pengyi1,2, Chen Xin3, Chen Wenting1,2, Yu Yan4   

  1. 1. School of Accounting, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou 510006;
    2. Institution of Cross-border M&A and Innovation Strategy, Research Center of Humanities and Social Sciences for Guangdong Province, Guangzhou 510006;
    3. School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510006;
    4. Business School, National University of Singapore, Singapore 119245
  • Received:2020-07-29 Online:2022-12-28 Published:2023-01-16

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摘要： 投行参与并购重组既可以提升投行声誉,又有利于提高市场并购效率。本文基于关系契约理论,以2013—2016年中国沪深A股发生并购事件的收购方上市公司为研究样本,研究投行在并购中的作用。研究发现,现有关系契约构建的投行关系损害了企业长期和短期并购绩效;投行声誉提升了企业长期并购绩效;在声誉较低的投行中,投行关系对并购绩效的负向影响更加显著。低效率并购提高了外部投资者与收购企业之间的信息不对称程度,引发投行的逆向选择和道德风险问题,从而降低了并购绩效。本研究揭示了投行关系和投行声誉对并购绩效的影响,为现阶段政府职能部门完善相关制度,进一步提升投行参与并购重组的效率提供了经验证据和政策启示。

关键词: 投行关系, 投行声誉, 并购绩效, 关系契约

Abstract: The participation of investment banks in M&As can not only enhance the reputation of investment banks but also improve the efficiency of M&As. Based on the relational contract theory, this paper examines the role of investment banks in M&As by taking the listed companies of acquirers who conducted M&As in China’s Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2013 to 2016 as the research samples. The results show that the investment bank relationship established by the existing relational contract damages long-term and short-term M&A performance; the reputation of investment banks improves long-term M&A performance; the negative impact of investment bank relationship on M&A performance is more significant among investment banks with lower reputations. Low-efficiency M&As increase the degree of information asymmetry between external investors and acquired companies, which causes adverse selection and moral hazard issues in investment banks, and thus reduces the performance of M&As. This study reveals the influence of investment bank relationship and reputation on M&A performance, and provides empirical evidence and policy inspiration for government functional departments to improve the relevant systems, and further improve the market efficiency of investment banks in M&As.

Key words: investment bank relationship, investment bank reputation, M&A performance, relational contract