不同奖惩机制下食品企业行为与政府监管演化博弈

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 食品安全关系到人们身体健康和社会稳定,食品企业机会主义行为导致的食品安全事件频发。根据食品企业和地方政府不同行为策略的支付矩阵,基于不同的奖励和惩罚机制下构建食品企业和地方政府的演化博弈模型,分析它们平衡点稳定性,并进行了算例分析。结果表明:在静态奖励和静态惩罚机制下,系统围绕一中心点震荡,没有均衡稳定点;在动态奖励静态惩罚机制下,系统演化过程是一个具有周期运动的闭环;在静态奖励动态惩罚和动态奖励动态惩罚机制下,食品企业和地方政府都趋于一个稳定均衡点,但动态奖励和动态惩罚机制效果更好。食品企业生产安全产品行为受地方政府奖惩力度的影响,当政府处罚强度增加时,企业生产安全产品概率增加,政府监管密度降低,监管成本降低;当政府奖励强度增加时,政府的监管概率降低,企业生产安全产品概率也降低但变化较小。研究结果对地方政府制定合理的奖惩机制具有一定的启示。

关键词: 食品安全, 奖励与惩罚机制, 演化博弈

Abstract: Food safety incidents occur frequently due to the opportunistic behavior of food enterprises and has constituted a threat to human health and social stability. This paper builds an evolutionary game model and uses a replicator equation to describe the selection and evolution path of food enterprises and local governments under various subsidy and punishment mechanisms according to the payoff matrices of their respective behavior strategies. Then, the influence of parameters on the evolutionary strategies of the system is analyzed. Finally, numerical simulations are given. The findings are as follows. Under the static subsidy and static punishment mechanism, producers’ efforts in food safety and local governments’ regulatory strategies fluctuate around a central point without a point of equilibrium and stability. Under the dynamic subsidy and static punishment mechanism, the system evolution process is a closed-loop with periodic motion. Under the static subsidy and dynamic punishment mechanism and dynamic subsidy and dynamic punishment, producers’s efforts and local governments’ regulatory strategies tend to remain at a stable equilibrium point. The evolution equilibrium of both parties in the system is affected by such parameters as the size of subsidy and punishment of government. The findings have certain enlightenment for local governments to formulate reasonable incentive strategies for subsidies and punishments.

Key words: food safety, subsidy and punishment mechanism, evolutionary game

杨松, 庄晋财, 孟祥海, 王爱峰. 不同奖惩机制下食品企业行为与政府监管演化博弈[J]. 管理评论, 2022, 34(3): 314-324.

Yang Song, Zhuang Jincai, Meng Xianghai, Wang Aifeng. The Evolutionary Game between Enterprise Behavior and Government Regulation under Various Subsidy and Punishment Mechanisms[J]. Management Review, 2022, 34(3): 314-324.

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