基于协议企业生产能力储备的应急物资采购定价模型

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (9): 294-303.

基于协议企业生产能力储备的应急物资采购定价模型

扈衷权¹, 田军², 冯耕中²

1. 西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院, 西安 710126;
2. 西安交通大学管理学院, 西安 710049

收稿日期:2018-07-09 出版日期:2021-09-28 发布日期:2021-10-09
通讯作者: 扈衷权(通讯作者),西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院讲师,博士
作者简介:田军,西安交通大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士;冯耕中,西安交通大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目（72102174）；教育部人文社会科学基金项目（21XJC630004；19YJA630068）；陕西省自然科学基础研究项目（2021JM-144）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金（XJS200601）。

The Pricing Model of Emergency Supplies Purchasing Based on Production Capacity Reserve

Hu Zhongquan¹, Tian Jun², Feng Gengzhong²

1. School of Economics and Management, Xidian University, Xi'an 710126;
2. School of Management, Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049

Received:2018-07-09 Online:2021-09-28 Published:2021-10-09

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为更好地促进与协议企业开展应急物资生产能力储备合作，政府需要对企业提供的物资进行合理定价。基于此，本文从市场机制角度出发，利用供应链中的数量柔性契约，建立了基于协议企业生产能力储备的应急物资采购定价模型。在推导出企业最优储备决策与政府最优采购定价后，本文发现政府自身储备量与灾害事件发生概率会对政企双方决策产生重大影响，继而进一步分析了这两个因素对政府成本以及企业利润的作用机制。研究结果表明，当政企双方决策达到均衡状态时，政府最优采购定价会随着灾害事件发生概率的增加而减少，但此时协议企业非但不降低储备量，反而会随之提高，其利润水平也随之增加。政府过量的自身储备不但会阻碍企业的合作意愿，还会使政府采购定价上升，增加其采购成本。最后，本文通过数值模拟的方式验证了所得结论的有效性。

关键词: 应急物资采购, 应急物资储备, 生产能力储备, 数量柔性契约, 定价博弈

Abstract: In order to better promote the cooperation with the contractual enterprises in the production capacity reserve of emergency supplies, governments need to reasonably price the supplies provided by enterprises. Based on this, from the perspective of market mechanism, this paper establishes a pricing model of emergency supplies procurement based on the capacity reserve of contractual enterprises by using a quantity flexible contract. After deducing the optimal reserve decision of the enterprise and the optimal purchasing price of the government, the paper finds that the quantity of government's own reserve and the probability of disasters have a significant impact on the decision-making of both the government and the enterprise. The impact of these two factors on the government' cost and enterprise's profit is further analyzed. The results show that when the decision-making of both the government and the enterprise reaches equilibrium state, (1) the optimal purchasing price of the government decreases with the increase of the probability of disasters, but at this time, the contractual enterprise would increase the reserve, instead of reducing it, resulting in a increase in profit; (2) excessive quantity of government reserve does not only hinder the willingness of the enterprise to cooperate, but also increases the purchasing price and the government's cost. Finally, the validity of the conclusions is verified by numerical simulation.

Key words: emergency supplies purchasing, emergency supplies reserve, production capacity reserve, quantity flexible contract, pricing game

扈衷权, 田军, 冯耕中. 基于协议企业生产能力储备的应急物资采购定价模型[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(9): 294-303.

Hu Zhongquan, Tian Jun, Feng Gengzhong. The Pricing Model of Emergency Supplies Purchasing Based on Production Capacity Reserve[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(9): 294-303.

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