管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (9): 237-248.

• 组织与战略管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

装备制造企业混合产品提供的多主体行为博弈分析

罗建强1,2, 张秦洪1, 杨子超1, 彭永涛1   

  1. 1. 江苏大学管理学院, 镇江 212013;
    2. 江苏大学中国农业装备产业发展研究院, 镇江 212013
  • 收稿日期:2018-06-08 出版日期:2021-09-28 发布日期:2021-10-09
  • 通讯作者: 罗建强(通讯作者),江苏大学管理学院教授,博士生导师,博士
  • 作者简介:张秦洪,江苏大学管理学院硕士研究生;杨子超,江苏大学管理学院博士研究生;彭永涛,江苏大学管理学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71772080;71704069;71802099)。

Game Analysis of Multi-agent Behavior of Equipment Manufacturers in Hybrid Offerings

Luo Jianqiang1,2, Zhang Qinhong1, Yang Zichao1, Peng Yongtao1   

  1. 1. School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013;
    2. China Research Institute for Agricultural Equipment Industry Development, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013
  • Received:2018-06-08 Online:2021-09-28 Published:2021-10-09

摘要: 为有效解决客户问题,以实物产品为载体衍生服务内容,形成产品与服务相匹配的混合产品,是当前中国装备制造企业面向服务型制造转型的重要途径。装备制造企业、政府与客户作为影响混合产品提供的参与主体,目标与行为的不一致性会影响提供的结果。为此,在厘清三方行为冲突的基础上,构建了多主体演化博弈模型,并以系统动力学为工具,仿真分析了不同主体行为与参数变化下的演化博弈过程及其变化规律。研究表明:若市场服务化程度高,即便政府不参与,供需双方也能实现理想的稳定状态;反之,三方共同努力才能实现混合产品的价值共创。在此过程中,政府需要通过供给侧和需求侧的“推拉”引导,制定适度的激励性补助和强制性惩罚制度,搭建供需交互平台;企业需要面向客户问题衍生高附加值的服务、放大未购买混合产品客户的潜在损失;客户需要避免短视,积极参与交互,实现个体和整体利益的协同。

关键词: 服务型制造, 混合产品, 服务衍生, 演化博弈, 系统动力学

Abstract: Hybrid offering is a significant way for Chinese equipment manufacturers to achieve the goal of service-oriented manufacturing transformation. In this process, manufacturers take service derivatives as the measure and match equipment products and derivative services to meet customer needs. However, the performance of hybrid offerings is influenced by different targets and actions from manufacturers, governments and customers. Accordingly, this study first clarifies their conflicts and interactions. On this basis, a three-party evolutionary game model is established. Finally, based on the model, a simulation method of system dynamics is used to analyze the changing rules under different agents' action strategies and parameters. The results show that if the servitization level is high, even without the participaton of governments, only the other two parties could achieve an iedal stability, but if the servitization level is low, all three parties have to participate to release the value of hybrid offering. Besides, in this offering process, governments should adopt "push-pull" method, develop appropriate incentive and mandatory penalty policies and set up interactive platforms; manufacturers should provide customers with higher-value-added services and highlight the potential loss of customers who don't buy hybrid offering; and customers should avoid falling into short-sighted mindset and actively join interactive activities. In this way, individual interests and value co-creation could be coordinated.

Key words: service-oriented manufacturing, hybrid offerings, service derivatives, evolutionary game, system dynamics