管理评论

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (9): 48-57.

• 经济与金融管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

银保渠道冲突机理及应对策略研究

张维今1, 侯泽敏2, 陈安平2, 王淑梅1   

  1. 1. 沈阳大学国际学院, 沈阳 110044;
    2. 东北大学工商管理学院, 沈阳 110169
  • 收稿日期:2020-12-15 出版日期:2021-09-28 发布日期:2021-10-09
  • 作者简介:张维今,沈阳大学国际学院副教授,博士;侯泽敏,东北大学工商管理学院博士后;陈安平,东北大学工商管理学院博士研究生;王淑梅,沈阳大学国际学院教授,博士。
  • 基金资助:
    辽宁省社会科学规划基金重点项目（L20AJL003）；中央高校基本科研业务费项目（N2006004）；沈阳市农学会项目（2021-8）。

Research on Channel Conflict Mechanism and Countermeasures of Bancassurance

Zhang Weijin1, Hou Zemin2, Chen Anping2, Wang Shumei1   

  1. 1. School of International Studies, Shenyang University, Shenyang 110044;
    2. School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169
  • Received:2020-12-15 Online:2021-09-28 Published:2021-10-09

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摘要： 借鉴纵向关系理论，将银保关系模型化为纵向服务交易关系，通过构建银保服务佣金决策模型，探讨了银保冲突的本质、机理以及对市场保费的影响。研究发现，保险公司为了获取银行渠道争相提升佣金，造成佣金决策的囚徒困境。佣金决策囚徒困境是导致银保冲突的本质原因：一方面导致银行没有激励和保险公司开展深入合作；另一方面导致中小型保险公司无法获取优质的银行渠道，从而被排挤出保险市场。但从保险产品的销售价格（保费）来看，佣金决策的囚徒困境并不一定会导致保费上升，在一定条件下可能会降低保费，提升保险购买者福利。本文的结论启示在于，银保监管政策的核心是要打破银保佣金决策的囚徒困境，促进保险公司佣金决策由个人理性走向集体理性。

关键词: 银保合作, 佣金决策, 囚徒困境, 银保监管

Abstract: Based on the theory of vertical relationship, the relationship between bank and insurance is modeled as a vertical service transaction relationship. By constructing the commission decision-making model of bancassurance service, the essence and mechanism of bancassurance conflict and its impact on market premium are discussed. It is found that insurance companies are keen to increase commission in order to obtain bank channels, which leads to the prisoner's dilemma in commission decision-making. The prisoner's dilemma of commission decision is the essential reason for bancassurance conflict:on the one hand, banks do not have incentives to cooperate with insurance companies; on the other hand, small and medium-sized insurance companies are unable to obtain high-quality banking channels, thus being excluded from the insurance market. However, judging from the sales price (premium) of insurance products, the prisoner's dilemma of commission decision will certainly lead to the increase of premium, which may reduce the premium and improve the welfare of insurance buyers under certain conditions. The conclusion of this paper is that the core of bancassurance supervision policy is to break the prisoner's dilemma of commission decision-making of bancassurance and promote the decision-making of insurance companies from individual rationality to collective rationality.

Key words: bancassurance cooperation, commission decision, prisoner's dilemma, bancassurance supervision