高管学术经历影响股价崩盘风险吗？

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文采用2008—2017年我国A股上市公司样本，研究了高管学术经历对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现：高管学术经历能够显著降低公司未来股价崩盘风险，在采用Heckman两阶段、PSM等方法控制了可能存在的内生性问题后，结论仍稳健。机制检验表明，高管学术经历同时通过信息质量假说和代理问题假说对股价崩盘风险产生影响。进一步检验表明，相较于其他高管的学术经历，CEO和CFO学术经历对股价崩盘风险的降低作用更加显著；当外部治理环境较弱以及当企业为国有企业时，高管学术经历对股价崩盘风险的降低效应也更加显著。本文结论为完善高管团队建设、提高公司信息质量、缓解第一类代理问题以及稳定资本市场发展具有一定借鉴意义，同时也丰富了关于高层梯队理论的研究。

关键词: 高管学术经历, 股价崩盘风险, 信息质量, 代理问题

Abstract: In recent years, stock price crashes happened frequently. Under the background of the current economic downturn pressure and unstable capital market, it is of great practical and theoretical significance to explore the governance mechanism of stock price crash risk. Based on the sample of Chinese A-share listed firms between 2008 and 2017, this paper investigates the impact of managerial academic experience on the stock price crash risk, and explores its influencing mechanism. The results show that, managerial academic experience can significantly reduce the stock price crash risk. The results hold when we use Heckman two-stage estimation, PSM approach, and other approaches to address endogeneity concerns. Next, we investigate the possible underlying mechanisms and find that, managerial academic experience reduces the stock price crash risk through both information quality hypothesis and agency problem hypothesis. Further study shows that, compared with the academic experience of other executives, the academic experience of CEO and CFO plays a more significant role in reducing the stock price crash risk. We also find that the effect is more pronounced for firms in a weaker external governance environment, and more pronounced for state-owned enterprises. This study not only has important practical implications for firms on improving the construction of top management team, improving the quality of company information, and alleviating the first type of agency problem, but also has important practical implications on the stable development of capital market in China.

Key words: managerial academic experience, stock price crash risk, information quality, agency problem

鲁桂华, 潘柳芸. 高管学术经历影响股价崩盘风险吗？[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(4): 259-270.

Lu Guihua, Pan Liuyun. Does Managerial Academic Experience Impact Stock Price Crash Risk?[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(4): 259-270.

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