实际控制人市场声誉能否成为融资约束的缓解器？——来自民营中小企业上市公司的经验证据

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文以实际控制人与投资者之间的代理问题为切入点，探索缓解民营企业融资约束的声誉机制。通过使用2009—2017年A股中实际控制人为自然人的中小板民营上市公司为研究样本，探究实际控制人的市场声誉是否能够作为民营企业融资约束的“缓解器”，并识别了其作用机制。实证结果发现，实际控制人的市场声誉上升显著地缓解了民营中小企业的融资约束，且这一声誉机制通过能力信号效应和行为约束效应降低实际控制人与投资者间的代理成本来实现。进一步地，缓解融资约束的实际控制人市场声誉机制在投资者保护水平较低地区的效果更明显。在投资者保护环境不完善的情况下，声誉机制作为正式契约形式的内部治理替代，对缓解民营企业融资约束发挥促进作用。本文的研究有助于加深对中国民营企业融资困境的认识，为从非制度环境的公司外部治理层面解决民营中小企业融资难题提供新思路。

关键词: 融资约束, 市场声誉, 实际控制人, 民营中小企业

Abstract: Based on the agency conflicts between actual controllers and investors, this paper investigates the reputation mechanism that functions as an alleviator of the financial constraints of private firms. By exploring a sample of private companies listed on SME Board with natural persons as actual controllers between 2009 and 2017, we examine whether and how the reputation of actual controllers alleviates the financial constraints of private SMEs. Empirical results show that the increase in the market reputation of actual controllers significantly reduces the financial constraints of private SMEs, and this reputation mechanism is realized by reducing the agency costs between actual controllers and investors through the ability signaling effect and the behavior restraint effect. Moreover, the impact of reputation of actual controllers on firms' financial constraints is greater for firms operating in areas with lower level of investor protection. With limited investor protection, reputation can serve as a substitute for internal governance to improve the efficiency of corporate governance and contribute to the alleviation of financial constraints of private firms. This paper extends the literature on the determinants of financial constraints of private enterprises and provides new evidence for solving the financing problems of private SMEs from the perspective of external corporate governance in a non-institutional environment.

Key words: financial constraints, reputation, actual controllers, private SMEs

李波, 程悦. 实际控制人市场声誉能否成为融资约束的缓解器？——来自民营中小企业上市公司的经验证据[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(2): 55-67.

Li Bo, Cheng Yue. Does the Reputation of Actual Controllers Alleviate the Financial Constraint of Firms?——Evidence from Private Companies Listed on SME Board[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(2): 55-67.

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