正面信息渲染与股价崩盘风险——基于安硕信息的案例分析

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 现有文献主要基于各影响因素通过作用于管理层负面信息隐藏的动机或能力，使得投资者对于负面信息反应不足，进而影响股价崩盘风险的影响路径。基于行为金融学过度反应理论，投资者不仅会由于管理层负面消息的隐藏而对负面消息反应不足，还会由于管理层正面信息渲染而对正面信息过度反应，并进一步影响股价崩盘风险。对此，借助资本市场昔日“股王”安硕信息股价崩盘事件，本文具体分析和验证了正面信息渲染的主要途径及其对于股价崩盘风险的影响路径。研究发现：大股东能够通过与卖方分析师合谋传播鼓吹性邮件和研究报告、调整机构投资者调研问答口径和公司公告宣传口径等方式渲染公司正面信息，抬升股票价格以实现私利；各影响因素通过强化上市公司正面信息加工、渲染、传播的能力，使得投资者对正面信息过度反应，造成股票价格大于内在价值，当内在信息集中释放时形成股价崩盘。

关键词: 信息渲染, 股价崩盘风险, 案例研究

Abstract: The existing literature is mainly based on the perspective that various factors affecting the motivation or ability of managers to hide negative information, which results in the insufficient response of investors to the negative information, and then influences the stock price crash risk. Based on the overreaction theory of behavioral finance, investors not only under-react to negative news due to the hiding of negative news from the management, but also overreact to positive information due to the rendering of positive information from the management, which in turn affects the risk of stock price crash. With the case of Amarsoft, this study analyzes the main way of positive information rendering and its influence mechanism on stock price crash risk. This study finds that major shareholders tend to render positive information of the company to achieve their own interests by colluding with the seller's analysts to spread propaganda emails and research reports, adjusting the answer of institutional investor research and company announcement. Besides, this study finds that various influencing factors make investors overreact to positive information, which may cause stock prices to exceed their intrinsic value and increase the risk of stock price crash.

Key words: positive information rendering, stock price crash risk, case study

程小可, 孙乾, 高升好. 正面信息渲染与股价崩盘风险——基于安硕信息的案例分析[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(1): 340-352.

Cheng Xiaoke, Sun Qian, Gao Shenghao. Positive Information Rendering and Stock Price Crash Risk——A Case Study of Amarsoft[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(1): 340-352.

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