供应链关系、信息优势与影子银行业务——基于上市非金融企业的经验证据

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 中国式影子银行活动的重要组成部分——游离于银行监管体系之外的非金融企业间的再放贷业务，受到了监管部门和学术界的广泛关注。本文利用标准普尔Compustat Global数据库提供的2007—2015年中国上市公司的样本，构建了中国非金融企业影子银行活动的度量指标，并基于“结构洞”视角，从企业供应链关系蕴含的信息优势出发，实证检验了信息优势对非金融企业影子银行业务规模的影响。本文发现，企业在供应链上接触的公司越多，掌握上下游企业的信息越多，影子银行业务规模越大。进一步研究发现，影子银行业务与信息优势之间的正相关关系在具有政治关联和存在盈余管理的企业中更加明显；在地区市场化程度高的企业中，这种正相关关系得到削弱。结果说明，在我国信息不对称和信贷约束的制度环境下，供应链关系可以向企业传递更广泛、更丰富的公司信息，从而使企业获得信息优势，增加影子银行业务。在使用影子银行和信息优势的替代指标以及内生性检验之后，上述结果依然稳健。本文的研究不仅从理论上对影子银行业务动因及信息获取等相关文献进行了补充，还在实务上对于当前影子银行监管和供应链管理具有重要的政策意义。

关键词: 影子银行, 供应链关系, 信息优势

Abstract: The re-lending business among non-financial enterprises which exists outside the banking supervision system constitutes an important part of Chinese-style shadow banking activities and has received widespread attention from regulators and academia. Based on the sample of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2015 provided by the Standard & Poor's Compustat Global database, this paper constructs the metrics of China's non-financial corporate shadow banking activities. Based on the perspective of "structural hole", this paper starts from the information superiority contained in the supply chain relationship of enterprises. The empirical test examines the impact of information superiority on the scale of shadow banking business of non-financial companies. The research in this paper finds that the more information the enterprise has on the upstream and downstream enterprises, the larger the scale of the shadow banking business. Our further research finds that the positive correlation between shadow banking and information superiority is more obvious in enterprises with political connection and earnings management; in the enterprises with high degree of marketization, this positive correlation is weakened. The results show that in the institutional environment of information asymmetry and credit constraint in China, supply chain relationship can transmit more extensive and richer company trait information to enterprises, so that enterprises can gain information advantage and increase shadow banking business. The paper also finds that the results are still robust after using the surrogate indicators of shadow banking, information superiority and testing endogeneity. The research in this paper not only theoretically supplies the literature on the causes of shadow banking business and information acquisition, but also has important policy significance for current shadow banking supervision and supply chain management.

Key words: shadow banking, supply chain relationship, information superiority

颜恩点, 谢佳佳. 供应链关系、信息优势与影子银行业务——基于上市非金融企业的经验证据[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(1): 291-300,329.

Yan Endian, Xie Jiajia. Supply Chain Relationship, Information Superiority and Shadow Banking——Empirical Evidence Based on Listed Non-financial Companies[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(1): 291-300,329.

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