管理层盈余预测类型与内部人交易行为

管理评论 ›› 2021, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (1): 254-268.

管理层盈余预测类型与内部人交易行为

周冬华¹, 赵玉洁², 陈敏洁¹

1. 江西财经大学会计发展研究中心/会计学院, 南昌 330013;
2. 江西财经大学金融学院, 南昌 330013

收稿日期:2017-11-21 出版日期:2021-01-28 发布日期:2021-02-03
作者简介:周冬华,江西财经大学会计学院教授,博士生导师,博士;赵玉洁,江西财经大学金融学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士;陈敏洁,江西财经大学会计学院硕士研究生。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目（71972091；71802101）。

Management Earnings Forecasts and Insider Trading

Zhou Donghua¹, Zhao Yujie², Chen Minjie¹

1. School of Accounting, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013;
2. School of Finance, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013

Received:2017-11-21 Online:2021-01-28 Published:2021-02-03

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 管理层盈余预测作为企业的业绩预告之一，具有缓解信息不对称的作用；对公司管理层和资本市场投资者均会产生十分重大的影响。本文从内部人交易这一独特的视角研究了管理层盈余预测过程中的机会主义行为。研究结果表明，管理层盈余预测有利于公司内部人的择机交易，公司发布利好的盈余预测消息后，公司内部人选择卖出自身股票，内部人卖出交易与管理层盈余预测好消息呈现出显著正相关关系，内部人交易与盈余预测之间的正相关性仅体现为董事会成员组别。进一步的研究发现，机构投资者和分析师跟踪等外部公司治理机制能够抑制公司内部人的择时交易行为。

关键词: 盈余预测, 内部人交易, 董事会成员, 自愿性披露

Abstract: As one of the mechanisms to reduce the information asymmetry, management earnings forecast is of great significance to investors and management. This paper studies the relationship between insider trading and management earnings forecasts. The results show that insider sell trading has a significant positive relationship with management earnings forecast when companies disclose the good news earning forecast, which conforms to the information hierarchy hypothesis. Furthermore, the significant relationship between insider sell trading and management earnings forecast is centralized in the board members sub-sample. We further finds that the effective mechanism of external corporate governance weakens insider selling.

Key words: management earnings forecasts, insider trading, board of directors, voluntary disclosure

周冬华, 赵玉洁, 陈敏洁. 管理层盈余预测类型与内部人交易行为[J]. 管理评论, 2021, 33(1): 254-268.

Zhou Donghua, Zhao Yujie, Chen Minjie. Management Earnings Forecasts and Insider Trading[J]. Management Review, 2021, 33(1): 254-268.

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