高管团队异质性、群体断裂带与企业风险承担

›› 2019, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (8): 157-168.

• 组织行为与人力资源管理 • 上一篇下一篇

高管团队异质性、群体断裂带与企业风险承担

孙玥璠¹, 陈爽¹, 张永冀²

1. 北京工商大学商学院, 北京 100048;
2. 北京理工大学管理与经济学院, 北京 100081

收稿日期:2018-11-14 出版日期:2019-08-28 发布日期:2019-09-11
通讯作者: 张永冀(通讯作者),北京理工大学管理与经济学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士
作者简介:孙玥璠,北京工商大学商学院副教授,硕士生导师,博士;陈爽,北京工商大学商学院硕士研究生。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金面上项目（71672010）；北京市工商管理高精尖学科建设项目（19005902053）；北京市会计学一流专业建设项目（19005903027）。

Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Top Management Team Heterogeneity, Faultlines and Corporate Risk-taking

Sun Yuefan¹, Chen Shuang¹, Zhang Yongji²

1. School of Business, Beijing Technology and Business University, Beijing 100048;
2. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081

Received:2018-11-14 Online:2019-08-28 Published:2019-09-11

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本研究融合了高管团队异质性与群体断裂带理论，以2011-2017年A股上市公司为样本分析高管团队异质性、群体断裂带对企业风险承担影响的异同及CEO权力和薪酬激励对“群体断裂带-风险承担”的调节作用。结果表明高管团队年龄异质性、教育程度异质性、职能背景异质性、社会资本异质性分别与企业风险承担显著的负相关；而高管团队群体断裂带与企业风险承担显著正相关；群体断裂带的作用机理较团队异质性更具解释力；CEO权力和薪酬激励对“群体断裂带-风险承担”关系具有负向调节作用，相对于货币薪酬激励，股权激励的调节作用更好。即企业需合理地安排高管团队人员结构并匹配相符的CEO权力大小及薪酬激励制度来应对不同的风险承担需求。

关键词: 高管团队异质性, 群体断裂带, 风险承担, CEO权力, 薪酬激励

Abstract:

This paper takes A share listed companies in 2011-2017 as the research object. By applying the theories of TMT heterogeneity and Group faultlines, we probe into the relationship among TMT heterogeneity, faultlines and risk-taking, as well as the moderating role of CEO power and compensation incentive in the relationship between faultlines and risk-taking. The results show that the age heterogeneity, education degree heterogeneity, functional background heterogeneity and social capital heterogeneity have significant negative correlation with enterprise risk-taking respectively. And there is a significant positive correlation between the faultlines of TMT and enterprise risk-taking. The mechanism of the group faultlines is more explanatory than the team heterogeneity. What's more, this paper verifies the moderating effect of CEO power and compensation incentive on the "group faultlines-risk taking" relationship, and the regulating effect of equity incentive is better than monetary compensation incentive. Companies need to reasonably arrange the structure of the TMT and match the corresponding CEO power and salary incentive system to meet different risk-taking requirements.

Key words: TMT heterogeneity, group faultlines, risk-taking, CEO power, compensation incentive

孙玥璠, 陈爽, 张永冀. 高管团队异质性、群体断裂带与企业风险承担[J]. , 2019, 31(8): 157-168.

Sun Yuefan, Chen Shuang, Zhang Yongji. Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Top Management Team Heterogeneity, Faultlines and Corporate Risk-taking[J]. , 2019, 31(8): 157-168.

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高管团队异质性、群体断裂带与企业风险承担

Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Top Management Team Heterogeneity, Faultlines and Corporate Risk-taking

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