基于博弈视角的自然垄断行业管网分离策略研究——以油气行业为例

›› 2019, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (8): 49-58.

基于博弈视角的自然垄断行业管网分离策略研究——以油气行业为例

董纪昌¹, 沙思颖^1,2, 李秀婷¹, 王炳¹, 苗晋瑜¹

1. 中国科学院大学经济与管理学院, 北京 100190;
2. 中信银行博士后科研工作站, 北京 100010

收稿日期:2017-11-03 出版日期:2019-08-28 发布日期:2019-09-11
作者简介:董纪昌,中国科学院大学经济与管理学院教授,博士生导师;沙思颖,中国科学院大学经济与管理学院博士研究生;李秀婷,中国科学院大学经济与管理学院讲师;王炳,中国科学院大学经济与管理学院博士研究生;苗晋瑜,中国科学院大学经济与管理学院博士研究生。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目（71173213；71403260）；中国博士后科学基金项目（2013M540129；2019M650990）；中国科学院青年创新促进会优秀会员经费资助。

Study on Network Separation Strategy of Natural Monopoly IndustryBased on Game Theory——Taking Oil and Natural Gas Industry as an Example

Dong Jichang¹, Sha Siying^1,2, Li Xiuting¹, Wang Bing¹, Miao Jinyu¹

1. School of economics and management, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190;
2. Postdoctoral Workstation, China CITIC Bank, Beijing 100010

Received:2017-11-03 Online:2019-08-28 Published:2019-09-11

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在现行体制下，油气等自然垄断行业由于集中度高，管道运输难以实现公平准入，存在管网投资不足、管道建设落后、利用率低等诸多问题。本文运用古诺双寡头垄断模型，分析我国油气管网纵向去一体化改革对社会福利的影响。并设计五种情景进行分析，识别适合我国自然垄断行业改革的有效路径。研究表明一体化企业的垄断会影响市场公平，增加下游企业的生产成本，造成消费者福利和社会总福利的损失；而剥离一体化企业的长距离管道网络，成立独立的管网公司可以较好的解决这一问题，有利于推动下游企业的良性竞争，增加投资，降低成本，提升效率，带来社会总福利的增加。因此现阶段必要推进网运分离，将管道运营与油气下游销售分开，严格定位为运输企业。

关键词: 古诺双寡头垄断, 一体化拆分, 网运分离

Abstract:

Under the current system, fair access into such natural monopoly industries as oil and natural gas is hardly achievable due to their vertically integrated operation mode. This has resulted in many problems, such as under-investment and lag in pipeline network construction, low transmission network utilization rates and high consumer prices. This paper uses Cournot Duopoly Model to analyze the impact of vertical integration reform on social welfare in China's oil and natural gas pipeline network. Five scenarios are designed to identify the effective path for the reform of natural monopoly industries in China. The results show that monopolistic behaviors of integrated enterprises will restrain the fair play in the market, force downstream enterprises to suffer higher production costs and impair consumer and social welfare. This problem can be effectively solved if long-distance pipeline network business is stripped off from those integrated enterprises and independent pipeline network companies are established separately. So doing will promote healthy competition, increase investment, reduce costs, improve efficiency and increase total social welfare.

Key words: Cournot duopoly, de-integration, pipeline network ownership/operation separation

董纪昌, 沙思颖, 李秀婷, 王炳, 苗晋瑜. 基于博弈视角的自然垄断行业管网分离策略研究——以油气行业为例[J]. , 2019, 31(8): 49-58.

Dong Jichang, Sha Siying, Li Xiuting, Wang Bing, Miao Jinyu. Study on Network Separation Strategy of Natural Monopoly IndustryBased on Game Theory——Taking Oil and Natural Gas Industry as an Example[J]. , 2019, 31(8): 49-58.

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